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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER: DOES THE
CONSTITUTION MAITER?
A Review of
Peter Irons, War Powers: How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the
Constitution (Henry Holt & Co., 2005)

John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs
After 9/11 (University of Chicago Press, 2005)
Reviewed by D.A. Jeremy Telman·
Peter Irons's War Powers favors congressional initiative in questions of war and
peace but makes a historical argument that our government has strayed from the
constitutional design in the service of an imperialist foreign policy. John Yoo's
The Powers of War and Peace seeks to overthrow the traditional perspective on
war powers espoused by Irons in favor of executive initiative in war. Yoo also
pursues a revisionist perspective on the treaty power, which favors executive
initiative in treaty negotiation and interpretation but insists on congressional
implementation so as to minimize the impact of international obligations on
domestic law. This Essay criticizes Irons's approach for its failure to provide a
normative defense of congressional initiative in war and takes issue with some of
the historical and structural analyses underlying Yoo's defense of executive
unilateralism in the realm of war powers. Because Yoo's arguments on the treaty
power raise questions of methodological consistency, he is susceptible to the
criticism that his arguments .are motivated more by prudential and policy
considerations than by fidelity to constitutional text, structure, and history. The
Essay concludes that, while the constitutional text, structure, and history are clear
and consistent and support Irons's arguments favoring congressional war powers,
the Constitution provides little guidance on how the treaty power should operate.
Yoo)s view that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in constitutional
text or structure. This Essay offers a structural interpretation of the constitutional
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treaty power different from Yoo's that would promote U.S. participation in
multilateral treaty regimes that foster security and the rule of la.w.
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I.

INTRODUCI'ION

Just when it seemed that Congress and the federal judiciary were going to
let the executive branch have its way in the war on. terror, the five-Justice
majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 announced that it will scrutinize executive
conduct in that conflict for compliance with norn1s mandated by both Congress
and international law. 2 The Court asserted its power to have some say in the
debate over foreign affa:irs powers. It remains to be seen just how active a role
the courts will play, thus reinvigorating a debate that was beginning to seem
purely academic over the proper allocation of such powers under the U.S.
Constitution.

1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 ("[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try
Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the [Uniform Code
of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions.").
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This Essay reviews two new books that take diametrically opposed
positions. In his War Powers,3 Peter Irons favors congressional initiative in the
realm of war powers, while John Yoo's The Powers of War and Peace4 favors
deference to the executive on foreign affairs. The Hamdan decision is to be
welcomed not because it resolves thorny questions regarding the foreign affairs
power, but because it opens a debate that both Irons and Yoo would like to
foreclose. As Justice Breyer put it:
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress,
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's
ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens
the Nation's ability to determine through democratic means how
best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic
means. Our Court today simply does the same.5
While Yoo has argued that the judiciary's role in foreign affairs should be
very small,6 Irons. blames executive decision making for substantive policy
decisions that he claims have "hijacked" the Constitution. This Essay argues,
with Justice Breyer, that the direction of our country's foreign affairs must
ultimately be detertnined through democratic processes involving all three
branches of the federal government, participatory politics, and compliance with
the United States' obligations under international law.
John Yoo is a self-described "revisionist"7 legal scholar who, in a series of
controversial articles,8 and now in this book, has sought to challenge traditional
3. PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE lMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE
CONSTITUTION (2005).
4. JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CoNSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 (2005).
5. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6. Yoo criticized the Hamdan decision in an editorial published just one day after the decision.
''What the justices did would have been unthinkable in prior military conflicts: Judicial intervention in
the decisions of the president and Congress on how best to wage war.'' John Yoo, 5 Wrong Justices:
Ruling Mistakes War for Familiarity of Nation's Criminal Justice System, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006,
at A22.
7. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that his book "will be counted as a contribution to the
revisionist side" and naming Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Saikrishna Prakash~ and Michael
Ramsey among revisionists questioning "dominant intellectual paradigm" on foreign affairs power).
8. Many of Yoo's arguments in the book were anticipated in earlier publications. See, e.g., John
C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Te~t, 69 U. On. L. REv. 1639 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text] (advocating textualist approach to determining allocation of constitutional war
powers); John C. Yoo, Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements,
99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (advocating structural approach to explain limited constitutionality of
congressional-executive agreements); John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES
FITzGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, SJ'AR WARS AND TilE END OF THE COLD
WAR (2000)) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics as Law] (defending Presidenfs authority unilaterally to

interpret, implement, and abrogate treaties); John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the M!..ltilateral
Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1689 (2000) (addressing effects of multilateral defense treaties on
constitutional allocation of war powers); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War
Powers Debate, 10 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Clio at War] (criticizing historical
methodology of legal scholars in war powers debate and making historical argument in favor of
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scholarly views on the foreign affairs power comprising the treaty power and
war powers. Yoo is an especially important figure because he not only has
advocated his positions in well-placed and influential scholarly articles but has
worked to put them into practice as legal advisor to the Justice Department
during the first term of President George W. B_ush. 9 Relying neither on the
postratification statements of the Framers nor on court precedent, Yoo
10
interprets the constitutional text,. structure, and preratification history as
supporting his expansive views_on the proper s_cope of executive foreign affairs
powers. 11 For example, despite the Declare War Clause, 12 Yoo argues that the
Constitution actually empowers the executive, not Congress, to take the
initiative in committing the United States to the use of force. 13 With respect to
the treaty power, Yoo contends that the Constitution primarily empowers the
President to negotiate, to implement, to interpret, and, if necessary, to abrogate
treaties. 14 He denies treaty law any binding force as U.S. law unless implemented
through the exercise of congressional legislative powers. 15

executive war powers); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (arguing that treaties should be
presumptively non-self-executing); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non·SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (same); John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation of Politics] (arguing that constitutional design was for
political branches to share war powers, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes antagonistically, but
that judicial supervision of war ·p owers is both unworkable and undesirable).
9. According to the New York Times, despite the fact that he was only a midlevel advisor,
because of Yoo's expertise in the area, he quickly established himself "as a critical player in the Bush
administration's legal response to the terrorist threat, and an influential advocate for the expansive
claims of presidential authority that have been a hallmark of that response.'' Tim Golden, A Junior
Aide Had a Big Role ih Terror Policy, N.Y. TIMES, De-c. 23, 2005, at A1; see also David Cole, What
Bush Wants to Hear, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Nov. 17, 2005, at 8, 8 ('~Yoo· had a hand in virtually every
major legal decision involving the US response to the attacks of Septe.mber 11. ...").
10. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 ("(T]his book concentrates less on judicial precedent and more on
constitutional text, structure, and history.").
11. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 9, at 8 (contending that Yoo's advice to President was always the
same: "the president can do whatever the president wants"); Golden, supra note 9 (stating that Yoo
authored legal opinions contending that Geneva Conventions did not apply to war on terror,
"countenanc[ing] the use of highly coercive interrogation techniques on terror suspects'' and
approving of warrantless eavesdropping on "international communications of Americans and others
inside the United States").
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
13. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 ("The president need not receive a declaration of war before
engaging the· U.S. armed forces in hostilities."); Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 8, at 170
("[T]he Framers created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war.").
14. See Yoo, supra note. 4, at 8 (stating that Constitution dictates that President is empowered
with "primary initiative to make·, interpret,. and t~rminate international agreements"); Yoo, Politics as
Law, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that executive has unilateral power to interpret domestic effect of
treaty obligations).
15. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 281 (arguing that in order to maintain "the line between executive
and legislative power, and between treatymaking and lawmaking," treaties must be presumptively
non-self~executing and congressional...executive agreements must be pennitted only in substantive
legal areas that implicate Congress's enumerated powers).
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Peter Irons is a political scientist who has previously published A People's
History of the Supreme Court. 16 His frequent citations to that previous work and
to Howard Zinn's A People's History of the United States: 1492 - Present11
telegraph the radical political perspective that underlies Irons's approach to the
question of war powers. 18 Although Irons never directly addresses either the
methodology or the substantive arguments of Yoo and other revisionist scholars,
he clearly believes that the Constitution allocates war powers to Congress. 19 He
nevertheless acknowledges that "the Constitution has not stood firm as a barrier
against presidential disregard of its command that only Congress has the power
to declare war. " 20
Irons and Yoo have diametrically opposed views of the meaning of the
Constitution as to war powers, but that would only lead them to have opposed
views on the proper allocation of war powers if they were both convinced
constitutional originalists. Neither Yoo nor Irons, however, express any
commitment to originalism. 21 Irons makes the traditional argument that the
Framers intended to entrust war powers to Congress, 22 but he makes no
normative argument for why we should be bound to that allocation today. Yoo's
position is more complicated. He rejects Irons's "intentionalist" approach in
favor of a "textualist" approach that inquires into the original meaning of the
constitutional text as it would have been understood by informed readers at the
3
time of its ratification.2 Y oo argues that this textual approach supports "a
16. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF 1HE SUPREME COURT (1999).
17. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492- PRESENT (2003).
18. The minimal scholarly apparatus appended to Irons's book likely does not do justice to
Irons's scholarly exertions. Nevertheless, the number of secondary sources to which he cites is
strikingly small and includes only Abraham Sofaer's War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power
representing the pro-executive side of the war powers debate. E.g., IRONS, supra note 3, at 25 (citing
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 49
(1976)) (discussing debates that took place during constitutional conventions over powers delegated to
executive and legislative branches). Since Irons writes to address the current war on terror, it is also
noteworthy that the only post-9/11 secondary sources to which he cites are written by journalists, Nat
Hentoff and Bob Woodward. See id. at 275-90 (citing NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON TilE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND THE GA1HERING RESISTANCE 66 (2003) ; BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 15, 118; 340
(2002); BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 132 (2004)) {discussing aftermath of 9/11 and Bush's
response).
19. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 3-4 (stating that "Framers placed the war-declaring power solely
in the hands of Congress" while limiting President's authority to that of repelling attacks on American
territory or authorizing reprisals for attacks on U.S. citizens or property abroad or on high seas).
20. /d. at 242. Unlike Yoo's book, Irons's book focuses exclusively on war powers and does not
address the treaty power.

21. Yoo provides an oddly diffident account of originalism, noting that some Supreme Court
Justices support originalism while others favor a "living Constitution." Yoo, supra note 4, at 25. He
also notes, without taking sides, that academics differ over "how much deference to provide the
Framers." !d.
22. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 23 (arguing that Framers intended five war powers clauses of
Article I to be read together in order to "lodgeD the ultimate power over the nation's armed forces in
Congress").
23. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 28 ("It is the original understanding of the document held by its
ratifiers that matters, not the original intentions of its drafters.").
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flexible decisionmaking system that can respond to such sweeping changes in the
international system and in America's national security posture."24 On war
powers, Yoo stresses that the Constitution leaves the political branches of the
federal government free to work out the allocation of war powers as they wish.25
But where as with respect to aspects of the treaty power the constitutional
text does not support such flexibility, Yoo cannot rely on an original
understanding of the Constitution. Rather, he makes prudential arguments,
suggesting that his primary allegiance as a scholar and as a political figure is not
to textualist originalism.26
Part II of this Essay summarizes Irons's traditional approach to war
powers which focuses on the intentions of the Framers and postratification
history and argues that his book fails to resolve the central tension it describes
between the constitutional allocation of war powers and recent practice, in which
Presidents make key decisions involving use of force. Part III reviews Yoo's
revisionist, textualist approach to war powers and suggests that textualism need
not lead to results at odds with the traditional approach to the constitutional
allocation of war powers. Part IV reviews Yoo's arguments
with respect to the
.
treaty power and contends that these arguments are linked less by their
commitment to textualist originalism than by their ingenuity in promoting
executive primacy in foreign affairs and in promoting federalist and separation of
powers principles over other constitutional principles that would give treaty law
binding force as U.S. law.
Finally, in Part V, this Essay argues that the Constitution's meaning should
not be left for the executive branch to determine. With respect to war powers,
this Part presents alternative "structural" interpretations of the Constitution and
argues that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution undermine
both Irons's interpretation, which does not permit for the evolution of
constitutional doctrines relating to the allocation of war powers, and Yoo's
interpretation, which presumes grants of executive power that are neither
express nor implied in the constitutional text. While Yoo's structural
interpretation with respect to the treaty power focuses on separation of powers,
Part V explores other structural elements to the Constitution., including limited
government, federalism, checks and balances, and a commitment to the efficacy
of international law.
.

24. /d. at x-xi.
25. /d. at 8 ("On the question of war, flexibility means there is no one constitutionally correct
method for waging war.").
26. See id. at 182 (arguing that government practice with respect to treaty power "represents the
practical outcome of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches"); cf. PHILIP
BOBB11T, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF TilE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (defining prudential
arguments as "advancing particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a
particular way"). Bobbitt later notes, summarizing Justice Hugo Black's textualist attack on the
prudential jurisprudence of Justice Felix Frankfurter, "(I]f a prudential approach is used to decide
between texts, then the texts themselves really count for nothing in the decision." Jd. at 60.
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IRONS AND THE TRADITIONAL P -E RSPECfiVE ON WAR POWERS

What I will here call the "traditional perspective" on war powers was
formed in the decades following the Vietnam War, when scholars such as_Louis
Fisher, Louis Henkin, Michael Glennon, Harold Koh, and John Hart Ely all
published books contending that the constitutional allocation of war powers calls
for congressional involvement in decisions involving the use of force and judicial
review of decisions relating to war and peace_.27 Although the sudden scholarly
passion for congressional war powers was linked to the Vietnam War and the illfated War Powers Resolution,28 its proponents maintain that their views on war
powers were simply assumed to be correct until the Nuclear Age. As Louis
Fisher puts it:
With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the Constitution
created a structure to prevent presidential wars. . . . Making
fundamental judgments about representative government, popular
control, and human nature, they placed the power of war and peace
with the legislative branch and divided foreign policy between the
President and Congress. For the most part, the Fram_ers' model
prevailed from 1789 to 1950.29
Support for the traditional perspective derives largely from three sources:
the constitutional text; statements by the Framers during the Constitutional
Convention, the ratification debates, or the early republic; and statements by

27. JOHN HARTELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER 1 PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed., rev. 2004); MICHAEL J.
GLENNON, CONSTffUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LoUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS {1990) (hereinafter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM); LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TilE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:

(1990); W. TAYLOR REVELEY Ill, WAR POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND 0LlVE BRANCH? (1981);.

SHARING PO\VER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

FRANCIS

D.

WORMUTH ET AL.,

To

CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN

HISTORY AND LAw (1986). Y_
o o critiques the traditional _a pproach as follows:
'

Conventional wisdom on the legal framework governing American foreign relations has
suffered from three significant flaws. First, scholars have sought to impose a strict, legalistic
process on the interaction of the executive and legislative branches in reaching decisions on
war and peace. Second, they have claimed that the original understanding of the framing
generation both dictates the limitation of presidential power in foreign affairs and
establishes a broad power in the federal government to make and implement international
.
.
agreements and in~ernational law. Third, they rely on judicial intervention to enforce this
precise vision of the balance of powers in foreign affairs, backed up as it is by the original
understanding.

Yoo,supra note 4, at 293.
28. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1541-48 (2000)).
29. Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV.l637, 1637 (2000). As late as
1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee remarked in its report on the War Powers Resolution:
"The transfer from Congress to the executive of the actual power as distinguished from the
constitutional authority to initiate war has been one of the most remarkable developments in the
constitutional history of the United Sates [sic]." S. REP. No. 93 ..220, at 14 (1973).
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30
scholars.

later politicians, judges, and
In short, advocates of the traditional
perspective argue that the original intentions of the Framers, as reflected in the
constitutional text, legislative history, and subsequent statements by the Framers
and others, were that -Congress holds the power to place the country in a state of
war.
Irons assumes that the traditional perspective on war powers is the only
reasonable one, and his book demonstrates the problems that arise under the
traditional approach. In Irons's view, the greatest harm done to the United
States by the current war on terror consists neither in the loss of human life nor
in the economic costs ofwar, but in the "gradual but increasing subversion of the
U.S. Constitution. " 31 The subversion consists of presidential usurpation of the
congressional power to declare war.32 Irons points out, however, that Presidents
have not acted alone in such usurpation. Congress and the federal courts have
been willing accomplices, as have "generations of Americans" who have not
called on their elected representatives to re_claim their constitutional war
powers. 33
Because Irons takes no notice of recent challenges to his intentionalist
approach to divining the meaning of the Constitution, he merely insists rather
than shows that those who think the Presidents have extensive war powers are
wrong. 34 The main weakness of Irons's thesis, however, is that his book presents
a version of U.S. history and foreign policy in which the political branches of the
U.S. government have consistently strayed from what he takes to be the
constitutional design in pursuit of what he describes as imperialist goals. While
Irons sets out to demonstrate that the imperial presidency hijacked the
constitutional allocation of war powers, what he in fact shows is that the political
branches have acted together to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and have not
let the niceties of the constitutional text, as he understands· them, interfere with
implementing their policy goals. If Irons is correct that our constitutional history
strays from the Framers' intentions regarding war powers, he needs to provide a
normative argument for why those intentions should guide us today.

A.

Irons's Intentionalist Approach

One of the strengths of Irons's book is that he economically sets out the
basics of the traditional perspe_ctive's claim that the constitutional text itself,
especially when considered in light of the Constitution's legislative history,
establishes the Framers' intent to locate the vast majority of war powers in the

30. For the most extended versions of this approach, see FISHER, supra note 27, REVELEY, supra
note 27, and WORMUTH ET AL.,supra note 27.
31. IRONS, supra note 3, at 2.

32. /d.
33. /d.
34. See, e.g., id. at 24 (criticizing U.S. Presidents for relying on Commander in Chief Clause to
"claim for themselves the war-making power the Framers specifically placed in the hands of
Congress"); id. at 267-69 (arguing that disparities in funding, staffing, and media coverage explain why
"Congress has virtually abdicated its constitutional war powers to the imperial presidency").
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Congress.35 He recounts the familiar narrative of how the constitutional draft
language, which would have given Congress the power to "make" war, was
changed, substituting "declare'' for "make."36 Pierce Butler had proposed
granting the power to make war to the executive. This proposal, tellingly, died
for want of a second.37 All agreed (and all still agree) that the President must
have the power to "repel sudden attacks." 38 Still, Irons argues, the Framers'
intent was that "only Congress could authorize the deployment of forces outside
the nation's territory in combat against foreign troops." 39
For Irons, the Framers' intent to repose war powers in Congress is made
manifest when one considers not just the Declare War Clause but the totality of
40
war powers enumerated in Article 1. In addition to granting Congress the
power to declare war, the Constitution also gives Congress the power to issue
letters of marque and reprisal and set rules concerning captures on land and
water;41 "[t]o raise and support Armies;';42 "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy;"43
"[t]o make Rules for the. Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces;"44 "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;" 45 and "[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part ·Of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.''46 Moreover, in
case there was any doubt, Congress also has the appropriations power,47 its
power to tax is linked to its obligation to "provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States,"48 and it has the power to make all "Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" 49 any of the
other enumerated powers. There is no other area where the Framers made their
intentions manifest through so many separate constitutional provisions.
The President's war powers derive from two textual sources: the
commander-in-chief power50 and Article II's Vesting Clause.5 1 The treaty power

35. See, e.g.~ FISHER, supra note 27, at 12 ("Whether declared or undeclared, the decision to
initiate war was left to Congress.").

36. IRONS, supra note 3, at 21.
37. ld. at 20-21.,
38. /d. at 21.
39. ld.
40. See id. at 23 ("Read together~ as the Framers clearly intended them to be, the five clauses in
Article 1 of the Constitution lodged the ultimate power over the nation's armed forces in Congress.").
41. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8; cl. 11.
42. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
43. Id. art. I,§ 8, cl.13.
44. /d. art. I,§ 8, cl. 14.
45. /d. art. I,§ 8; cl.l5.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl.16.
47. ld. art. I,§ 7, cl. 1.
48. /d. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1.
49. /d. art. I,§ 8; cL 18.
50. Jd art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1.
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and the Appointments Clause supplement these clauses to constitute a
considerable grant of foreign relations power to the President, but that power is
not generally viewed as granting war powers to the President.52 From the
traditional perspective, these provisions grant the President broad powers to
conduct foreign relations on behalf of the United States, but subject to the
limitations provided through the enumeration of congressional powers in Article
. 53

I.

The traditional view that the commander-in-chief power is narrowly
circumscribed is buttressed by the constitutional text, which specifies that the
President "shall be Commander in ChieJ of the Arn1y and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States." 54 The Framers saw standing armies under the control of a
powerful executive as a threat to democracy and thus anticipated that there
would be no significant federal army.55 Alexander Hamilton, no enemy of
executive power, acknowledged that the President would exercise his
commander. . in-chief power only in "the direction of war when authorized or
begun."56 Moreover, as Irons indicates in the one area of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century history where he is more thorough than Yoo, the point of the
commander-in-chief power traditionally was not to create executive war powers
but to subordinate the military to civil authority. 57

52. Neither the traditional perspective nor Yoo's revisionist approach treat the treaty power or
the Appointments Clause as creating war powers. Indeed, Yoo reasons by analogy that the
Appointments aause limits the President's power to authorize U.S. military personnel to serve under
foreign command as part of multinational forces. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 176-81 (stating that foreign
commanders would not be subject to executive power in same way other appointees would be, and as
result, unless executive "[r]etain[s] policy and tactical command," use of foreign commanders would
likely violate-Constitution); cf FISHER, supra note 27, at 12-13 (discussing only Commander in Chief
Clause as source for executive war powers).
53. See IRONS, supra_note 3, at 23 (arguing that exe_c utive war powers were limited to response to
"immediate situation" and that Congress alone could grant President authority to command troops).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2 (emphasis added).

55. See, e.g., MAX M.

EDLING,

A

REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF TiiE

U.S. CONS'I'fi'UTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 120-21 (2003) (recounting AntiFederalist opposition to standing armies and discussing Federalist plans for peacetime force of 3000,
including corps of engineers); REVELEY, supra note 27, at 65 (characterizing federalist view as "there
would be no armies, navies, or militia for [the President) to lead unless Congress so provided'~);
WORMUTH ET AL, supra note 27, at 110 (recounting Feder~list responses to concerns about executive
abuse of commander-in-chief power, which centered on Congress's ability to check that power through
its power to raise fleets and armies); Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1680
("After the peace with Great Britain, the United States did not immediately maintain a large
peacetime army or navy and did not really do so until the Cold War.").
56. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 292 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); see
also IRONS, supra note 3, at 26-27 (citing Iredell, Hamilton, and Madison and concluding that
"Madison's emphatic statement, and the entire record of the Constitutional Convention, leaves no
doubt that the Framers agreed that Congress, the body elected by the people, should hold the
awesome power to commit the-nation to war").
57. See_IRONS, supra note 3, at 24-25 (stating that it became fundamental principle of U.S.
Constitution, as it was in British Army, that military officers be placed under command ofa civilian);
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That leaves Article II's Vesting Clause as the most likely source for
significant war powers. As Y oo and others have pointed out)58 unlike Article I,
which vests in Congress only "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted," 59 Article
II simply states that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a fresident of the
United States of America."60 Yoo takes this to signify that, while Congress)s
constitutional powers are limited to those enumerated in Article I, the President
has all powers associated with executive power at the time of the framing.6 1 The
traditional perspective rejects any claim of executive war powers based on the
Vesting Clause alone, which on its face seems to indicate only that the executive
power will be invested in one President rather than in a plural body, as it was, for
example, under the Articles of Confederation. 62 Yoo's argument for executive
powers purports to be a textual argument based on the Article II Vesting
Clause.63 In fact, Yoo's argument is based on an interpretation of seventeenthand eighteenth-century political theory and practice, which in turn generates an
interpretation of the constitutional text. 64 The text of the Constitution, standing
alone, lends strong support to the traditional perspective on war powers. 65 As
John Hart Ely has pointed out, while the original intent of the Framers is often
so obscure that we are really left to our own devices, the Constitution is perfectly
clear in the realm of war powers.66

B.

Irons's Historical Approach

If the textual argument in favor of congressional control over war is not
convincing enough, Irons's book also does an excellent job of setting out some of
the best evidence from the legislative history and from subsequent historical
gloss_es on the constitutional text to establish a strong foundation for the

cf WORMUTH ET AL., supra note 27, at 105-07 (providing brief history of office of commander in chief
in English and colonial history from 1639 through American Revolution).
58. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting Justice Scalia as stating that Article Il's Vesting
Clause "does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power" is vested in the
President (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
60. /d. art. lit§ 1.
61. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 ("If we assume that the foreign affairs power is an executive one,
Article II effectively grants to the president any unenumerated foreign affairs powers not given
elsewhere to the other branches.;').
62. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 554 (2004) ("The Article II Vesting Clause may simply make clear
'
where the executive_power is being vested in a unitary President not the scope of that power.").
63. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18, 183-84.
64. See id. at 30-54 (examining allocation of war and treaty powers in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century thought and in Anglo-American practice).
65. REVELEY, supra note 27, at 29 ("If we could find a man in the state of nature and have him
first scan the war·power provisions of the Constitution .•• he would marvel at how much Presidents
have spun out of so little,. On its face, the text tilts decisively toward Congress.").
66. ELY, supra note 27, at 3 (contending that "original understanding)' of Constitution is often
"obscure to the point of inscrutability," but tha.t Framers were clear in vesting power to declare war in
Congress).
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traditional perspective on war powers. On the structural level, Irons points to
numerous writings by the Framers indicating their desire to have checks on
executive power and their fear of executive unilateralism especially in the
domain of war powers.
After their experience with the English monarchy, the Framers sought to
prevent such powers from being vested solely in the executive. 67 Upon hearing
Pierce Butler's recommendation that the power to initiate war be vested in the

President, Elbridge Gerry remarked; "[I] never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."'68 Madison even
proposed prohibiting the President from having a role in negotiating peace
treaties. 69 He feared that a President might try to impede the peace in order to
derive "power and importance from a state of war. " 70
Later commentary by important Framers, both during the ratification
debates and during the early republic, was consistent with statements made at
the Constitutional Convention.71 As James Madison put it in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson: "The constitution supposes ... that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of
power most interested in war, [and] most prone to it. It has accordingly with
studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl[ature]."72 Similarly, writing
as Helvidius in his exchange with Alexander Hamilton, Madison asserted that
"[i]n _no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause
which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the

67. Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison: "We have already given ... one effectual check
to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.," Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392,397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958)
(footnote omitted).
68. IRONS, supra note 3, at 21 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 56, at 318). Eight delegates stated their opposition to giving the executive the power to
initiate war. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF 1787, supra note 56, at 64-66, 70,
291-92, 318, 319 (recording statements of Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, James Wilson, James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, and George Mason). Two other
delegates, Oliver Ellsworth and Rufus King, strongly suggested that the President should not have
substantial war powers. /d. at 319.
69. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 56, at 540.

70. Jd.
71. See Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor
Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685, 1713-17 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Text and. History] (reviewing
evidence from 1790s in favor of expansive reading of Declare War Cause); Michael D. Ramsey,
Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. On. L. REV. 1543, 1603-09 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, TextlUllism]
(collecting quotations from Alexander Hamilton, James Iredell, Charles Pinckney, James Madison,
and James Wilson and reviewing practice of Washington presidency, all favoring congressional over
executive war powers).
72. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRmNGS OF
JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 311,312 (Gaillard Hunted., 1906). Madison expressed the same ·views
during his Helvidius/Pacificus exchange with Hamilton: "(T]he executive is the department of power
most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence- it is the practice_of all states, in proportion as they
are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence." James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. W,
GAZE1TE U.S., Sept. 14, 1793, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra, at 138, 174.

.•
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executive department."73 As Michael Ramsey put it, "Madison, Hamilton,
Jefferson, Wilson, Washington, Jay, Marshall, and an array of lesser figures
indicated that war power lay primarily with Congress, and no prominent figure
took the other side. ''74
In the early republic, courts, to the extent that they weighed in on the
subject, generally supported the notion of congressional control over questions
of war and peace. In Bas v. Tingy, 15 Justices Washington and Patterson analyzed
the state of affairs between the United States and France in terms of whether
congressional actions sufficed to establish a state of war between the two
nations. 76 In Little v. Barreme,11 Justice Marshall, although originally inclined to
excuse Captain Little's trespass against a Dutch vessel on the ground that
Captain Little's conduct was authorized by President Adams, acquiesced in the
views of his brethren "that the instructions cannot . . . legalize an act which
without those instructions would have been a plain trespass. "78 In short, the
President could not unilaterally authorize a military action, even a trifling one,
that exceeded the Congress's authorization for the use of force. Justice Paterson,
riding circuit in New York, stated in United States v. Smith19 that the President
does not possess the power of making war because ''[t]hat power is exclusively
vested in congress. "8°
More significant, however, were the attitudes of the United States' first
chief executives, as expressed during their presidencies. As early as 1793, when
the Governor of Georgia asked President Washington to send U.S. troops to
intervene in border skirmishes between frontier settlers and Indians, Washington
declined, explaining that "no offensive expedition of importance" could be taken
without congressional authorization.81 Washington's Secretary of War warned
territorial governors that military operations were confined to defensive
measures unless Congress decided otherwise,82 because Congress alone was

73. Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. W, supra note 72, at 174.
74. Ramsey, Textualism, supra note_71, at 1566.
75. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
76. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40-42 (Washington, J.) (discussing possibilities of "solemn" and
"imperfect" war); id. at 45 (Paterson, J.) (noting that United States and France were engaged in
imperfect war and asserting that "[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so
far may we proceed in hostile operations"); IRONS!< supra note 3, at 36-37.
77. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
78. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179; IRONS, supra note 3, at 39. Marshall was never inclined to
think that an executive order standing alone could authorize seizure of a foreign vesseL Rather, he
thought that such an order might support excuse of damages. See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179 C'I
confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the. opinion that though the instructions
of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages.").
79. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y~ 1806) (No. 16,342)~
80. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230; IRONS, supra note 3, at 41.
81. Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 THE WRmNGsOF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73, 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
82. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERIUTORY SOUTII OF THE. RIVER OHIO, 1790-1796, at 194,. 195
(Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936) [hereinafter THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES].
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"vested with the powers of War" 83 and Congress alone was "competent to decide
upon an offensive war. ,84 Jefferson similarly explained to Congress that an
American Navy Captain had disabled a Tripolitan pirate ship but had released
the captured pirates becaose the Navy was not authorized to take nondefensive
measures without the sanction of Congress.85 In Jefferson's view, Congress alone
could determine the scope of a conflict, and if only a ransom should be
demanded, Congress would set the amount. 86
John Yoo has argued that a declaration of war is merely an official
recognition that a state of war exists.87 The Declare War Clause thus is not a
grant of legislative power to the Congress, but rather confers on Congress the
power to make a declaratory judgment, which gives it authority to pass
legislation appropriate for wartime.88 As Irons shows, however, in the early
republic, Presidents recognized that they needed a congressional declaration of
war before they could commence hostilities or even before, they could expand
existing hostilities. The Declare War Clause thus was not understood as a grant
of judicial power but as a grant of war powers. In June 1812, Madison declared
that a "state of war" existed between the United States and Britain but
presented Congress with 'Ha solemn question which the Constitution wisely
confides to the legislative department of the Government. "'89 The, Senate at first
refused to declare war and wanted to limit the U.S. response to reprisal but
approved the declaration of war a few days later. 90 'T he incident makes clear that
Madison, acting as President, believed that he needed ,congressional
authorization before committing American forces to war, even though he
believed that a state of war already existed. Irons shows that this perspective on
war powers was generally shared by V~S. Presidents.91
83. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Nov. 26, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STAlES, supra note82, at 220, '221.
84. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Mar. 23, 1795), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 82, at 386,389.
85. Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 326,326-27 {James D. Richardson ed., 1900).
86. /d. at 327; see also IRONS, supra note 3, at 31 (quoting Jefferson as stating, "Upon the whole;
it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom as the means of re~establishing our
Mediterranean commerce.").
87. See Yoo; Continuation of Politics, supra note 8, at 207-08 ("[A] declaration of war served the
purpose of notifying the ,e nemy, allies, neutrals, and one's own citizens of a change in the state of
relations between one nation and another. In none of these situations did a declaration of war serve as
a vehicle for domestically deciding on or authorizing a war.").
88. See Yoo, s1-1-pra note 4, at 332 n.14 ("(T]be Declare War Clause gives Congress the power to
'declare' whether ... a certain state of affairs legally constitutes a War, which then gives it the authority
to enact wartime regulations of individual persons and property both within and outside the United
States.").
89. IRONS, supra note 3, at 47.
90. /d.
91. See, e.g., id. at 59-60 (quoting Lincoln to effect thaLauthors of Constitution had placed war
power in handS of Congress because they '"resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man
should hold the power' of taking the nation into war"); id. at 64 (quoting Buchanan, who told
Congress in 1858 that the President ''cannot legitimately resort to force without the direct authority of
'

'
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But Irons also presents a counternarrative that establishes a long tradition
of U.S. Presidents exercising unilateral nondefensive war powers. According to
Irons, Thomas Jefferson "first cracked open the door through which later
presidents barged with impunity."92 In 1807, when a British vessel fired on the
American frigate Chesapeake, Jefferson responded while Congress was in
recess.93 Irons thinks the incident constituted a "compelling'' crisis to which
Jefferson had to respond, but he also thinks later Presidents have used the
excuse of necessity to justify executive unilateralism in much more questionable
cases.94
In 1846, President Polk claimed that Mexico had invaded U.S. territory and
requested a declaration recognizing an existing state of war between the two
countries.95 Still, Polk recognized that a fonnal declaration was required, and
members of Congress at the time recognized that the President's declaration of
war had no constitutional significance. 96 But by midcentury, as Irons
acknowledges, the federal judiciary was increasingly deferential toward
executive authorizations of the use of force. 97 In the twentieth century, Irons
laments, U.S. Presidents have become far bolder in their assertions of unilateral
authority to use military force.98

C.

Conclusion: The Normative Limitations of Originalism

Irons's book offers two arguments: first, that Congress, the courts, and U.S.
citizens have permitted Presidents to usurp war-making authority from the
Congress; and second, that Presidents have exercised their war powers
illegitimately, not only as a constitutional matter, but also geopolitically, to
pursue an imperialist foreign policy. Irons believes that the United States goes to
war far too readily and without much thought to the constitutional procedures
that ought to guide it.
Congress, except in resisting and repelling hostile attacks''); see also REVELEY, supra note 27, at 277-85
(providing "sampler" of executive statements supporting congressional control over powers of war and
peace).
92. IRONS, supra note 3, at 42.
93. Id.
94. /d. at 42-43.
95. ld. at 57.
96. /d. (quoting Senator John Calhoun's denunciation of Polk for announcing war when "there is
no war according to the sense of our Constitution'').
97. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 63-64 (discussing Southern District of New York's ruling in
Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186)), which upheld decision of naval
commander to order bombardment of Nicaraguan port as part of executive authority to protect lives
and _p roperty of U.S. citizens); id. at 71-75 (discussing Civil War Priz.e Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862), and siding with four dissenters in accusing Supreme Court of abdicating its constitutional
responsibility to say what law is).
98. See, e.g., id. at 108 (discussing Woodrow Wilson's view that Presidents have absolute control
over foreign affairs); id. at 129 (criticizing Franklin Delano Roosevelt's comnritment to lend destroyers
to United Kingdom six months prior to congressional authorization of that deal through Lend-Lease
Act); id. at 211 (noting that every President since Gerald Ford has claimed "the 'inherent' right to
initiate military action without prior congressional approval'').
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Irons does not argue, however, that congressional foreign policy objectives
were any less imperialist than those of the executive. Thus, the relation between
Irons's title, War Powers, and his subtitle, How the Imp,erial Presidency Hijacked
the Constitution, is unclear. 99 Moreover, even if we assume that Irons is correct
about the constitutional design with respect to war powers, he provides no
normative argument for why the Constitution must mean for us today what the
Framers intended it to mean. Therefore, it is hard to see why Irons's narrative of
executive war powers is one of constitutional hijack rather than one of
constitutional development. In short, Irons's book provides an argument that the
Constitution allocates war powers to Congress and a historical narrative that
demonstrates that our practice has strayed from the historical design. He does
not ponder the question of whether or to what extent the constitutional design
should matter.
Ill. 'Y OO'S TEXTUALIST INNOVATION

Yoo's work is indebted to a textualist approach that can be found in some
recent scholarship on war powers, 100 much of it inspired by Justice Scalia's
approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation. 101 These scholars argue
that the best way to get at the original meaning of the Constitution is to try to
understand what the constitutional text originally meant that is, how that text
would have been understood by the eighteenth-century mind. 102 The approach
that tries to get at original intentions, say the textualists, is antidemocratic. Since
the Constitution is, an agreement that was ratified through representative

99. Irons's narrative of congressional and popular support for the United States' expansive
foreign policy undercuts any possible claim that executive usurpation of congressional war powers is at
the, root of American imp,erialism. See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 3, at 47 (suggesting that War of 1812,
which Madison's critics dubbed "Mr. Madison's war," was one that Madison himself had tried to avoid
and noting that "inflammatory newspaper reports" led American public to issue ~'heated calls for
war"); id. at 89-90 (recounting President Cleveland's refusal to lead war against Spain despite
congressional threat to declare war).
100. Recent scholarship exemplifying a textual approach to war powers includes an exchange
between Michael Ramsey and John Yoo: Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, and Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, supra note 8; as well as Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, and Saikrishna
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 ·Y ALE L.J. 231
(2001).
101. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MAITER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22-23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The text is the law, and it is the
text that must be observed., I agree with Justice Holmes[] .. . : 'We do not inquire what the legislature
meant; we ask only what the statute, means."').
102. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 107 (arguing for controlling significance of constitutional text in
ratification debates, ,s ince those who ratified Constitution had only constitutional text and not
legislative history that was published later); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 100, at 234 n.1 ("[W]e
think the best evidence of the meaning of a text is to see how intelligent and engaged people at the
time it was written commonly understood the words it employs."); Ramsey, Textualism,.supra note 71,
at 1553-54 ("[M]odern theories of original understanding focus much less on a reconstructed or
subjective Framers' intent and much more on the objective meaning of the constitutional text, as it
would have been understood at the time it was written.").
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processes, it ought not to bind its ratifiers to intentions that are not manifest in
the constitutional text itself. 103 Rather, the constitutional text should bind U.S.
citizens to what an ordinary reader at the time would likely have understood the
text to mean. 104
One can and others have raised numerous objections to this textualist
approach to both statutory and constitutional interpretation. 105 With respect to
war powers, however, those criti~isms seem beside the point. Whether one
attempts to establish the meaning of the Constitution through a reconstruction of
the intentions of the Framers or through an inquiry into the meaning of the
constitutional text, one can arrive at the same results. While there might be areas
where the Framers' intentions and textual meaning diverge, the war power is not
one. 106 The traditional perspective is largely a product of the intentionalist
approach to constitutional interpretation,107 and it arrives at the conclusion that

103. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 27-28 ("[T]his book focuses on the Framers' beliefs and actions in
the ratification process because the Constitution was the result of a democratic political process.
Ratification by popularly elected conventions gave the Constitution its political legitimacy.").
104. See id. at 28 ("What those who ratified the Constitution believed the meaning of the text to
mean is therefore more important than the intentions of those who drafted it."); Ramsey, Textualism,
supra note 71, at 1555 ("[T]he inquiry is not what any individual member of the constitutional
generation intended, or even our best guess as to what that generation collectively intended; it is,
instead, the best reading of the text.").
105. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (1990)
(arguing that, despite Scalia's beliefs, Constitution does not favor "new textualism" more than other
interpretation schemes); William D. Popkin, An ulnternal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1173-86 (1992) (rejecting Scalia's argument that public
respect for courts is eroded when courts depart from textualist approach and inquire into legislative
intent); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 15 B.U. L. REV. 321, 383-85 (1995) (developing
positive account of methodology of textualism, as opposed to viewing textualism simply as critique of
intentionalism, but concluding that textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial
discretion in statutory or constitutional interpretation); David Sosa, The Unintentional Fallacy, 86
CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA'ITER OF INTERPRETATION (1997))
(arguing that indeterntinacy in statutory language undermines textualist project and that textualist
project becomes even more suspect when refined to originalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 564-65 (1997) (reviewing SCALIA, supra) (defending
common law approach to constitutional law as embodying "judicial modesty," allowing for flexibility
and as preferable to Scalia's approach in terms of accommodating democratic ideals).
106. As the discussion to follow will indicate, the two approaches are not as divergent as they
may appear, since textualists rely on the same sources of information to establish the most likely
meaning of the constitutional text to the eighteenth-century mind as the intentionalists rely on to
establish the Framers' intentions~ See, e.g., Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1569 (conceding that
"views of the drafters and their contemporaries ... are nonetheless an important interpretive tool" for
textualists ).
107. Although the traditional perspective does pay careful attention to the constitutional text, the
bulk of the argument relies on extensive quotations from the Framers setting out their understanding
of the meaning of that text. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 27, at 3-5 (relying on Framers' statements in
concluding that declaring war is power vested in Congress); FISHER, supra note 27, at 3-14 (marshalling
evidence from annals of Constitutional Convention, ratification debates, and correspondence of
Framers); WORMUTH ET AL., supra note 27, at 17-19 (reviewing legislative history and ratification
debates relating to Declare War Clause); id. at 108-10 (reviewing legislative history and ratification
debates relating to Commander in Chief Clause). Reveley devotes a chapter to the constitutional text.
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the Declare War Clause was intended to give Congress authority to commence
hostilities; whether by formal declaration or otherwise. 108 Although Yoo
disagrees, a textualist account of the constitutional allocation of war can lead to
the same conclusion. 109
If one is accustomed to the traditional approach to war powers, Yoo's
approach can be disorienting~ Rather than proceeding from a discussion of the
text to a discussion of what the Framers said about the text, Y oo begins with his
synopsis of the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers on the
appropriate allocation of war powers in a constitutional monarchy. 110 There
follows a discussion of the practice. of the colonies and the states during the socalled "Critical Period" before the ratification of the Federal Constitution. 111
Yoo then asserts that the views of the actual authors of the Constitution are not
the best guide to the meaning of the document. 112 Rather, what really matters,
Y oo argues, is what the ratifiers of the Constitution believed the Constitution
meant insofar as we can tell. 113 Having reviewed this historical material, Yoo
concludes that the Constitution, properly understood against the background of

REVELEY, supra note 27, at 29·50. But he devotes three to a discussion of the eighteenth-century
background, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification debates. /d. at 51-115.
108. Irons devotes his first chapter to the Constitutional Convention. IRONS, supra note 3, at 1127. He does not devote nearly as much space to the ratification debates and Weighs the evidentiary
value of utterances in those debates no differently from later statements regarding the meaning of the
Constitution. See id. at 25 ("The debates in the convention, the later writings of delegates to that
meeting, and speeches in the state conventions that voted on ratification of the Constitution leave no
doubt that the president's title and role as commander in chief gave him no powers that Congress
could not define or limit.").
109. See Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71,. at 1609 (stating that text, structure, and ratification
debates support congressional power to initiate war "through words ... or action" because ''declare
war" has ambiguous textual meaning from eighteenth·century viewpoint).
110. Yoo, supra note 4, at 30-54.

111. /d. at 55-87.
112. See id. at 107 (noting that Madison's notes on Constitutional Convention were not available
to ratifiers, who could rely only on text itself and on their knowledge of political and constitutional
history, and calling ratification debates "perhaps the most important source for understanding the
Constitution"). Yoo's position on the significance of the ratification debates is not unusual. The
argument in favor of privileging the history of ratification over that of the Philadelphia Convention
goes back to James Madison but has recently been revived by the historian Jack Rakove and by legal
scholars such as Charles Lofgren and Bruce Ackerman. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2126-27 & nn.139-40 (1999) (reviewing original and modem views on
privileging ratification debates over those at Constitutional Convention).
113. Y oo acknowledges that there are difficulties associated with using the ratification debates as
a source for getting at the Constitution's meaning, but he does not fully acknowledge the nature of
those- difficulties. Yoo, supra note 4, at 107~ As one of Yoo's critics points out,. '~we have records of
only some of these conventions, and the records that do exist are abysmal." Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Laughing at Treaties; 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2162 (1999); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN TilE MAKING OF TilE CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) (noting problems
with relying on ratification debates, for example, "spotty" manner of reporting on de_b ates and
"obscure" participants in debates and concluding that only definite conclusion drawn from debates is
ratifiers' preference for Constitution over Articles. of Confederation).
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eighteenth-century political theory,1 14 "does not establish a fixed process for
foreign relations decisionmaking" 115 and thus "provide[s] the political branches
with far more flexibility in managing foreign relations than is commonly
assumed.'; 116
A.

Political 'Theory and the Constitutional Text

In the war powers context, textualism arises as a critique of the traditional
perspective's characterization of the Constitution as riddled with lacunae on the
subject of the foreign affairs power. 117 Textualism sets out to show that "there
are no gaps in the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers. " 118
Textualism can make this argument because part of its agenda has been an
expansive reading of executive authority; a reading that can fill any gaps in the
constitutional enumeration of the powers of the federal government by·
allocating such powers to the executive. 119 According to this textualist view, the
Constitution enumerates only the powers associated with executive power that
were transferred to Congress~ 120 According to Yoo and other textualists, the
"lacunae" identified by the traditional perspective reflect eighteenth-century
assumptions that the powers in question are executive in nature.
1.

Political Theory and Practice
.

.

The scope of Yoo's historical perspective on the framing of war powers is
impressive, encompassing "the British constitution in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, state constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation. " 121
Yoo's great innovation is to develop the argument that there was a consensus
among eighteenth-century politicians and political theorists about the proper
.

.

114. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that his book "concentrates less on judicial precedent
and more on constitutional text, structure, and history.... [and] begins by telling the story of the place
of foreign affairs in the development of the American constitutional system during the late eighteenth
centuryn).

115. /d. at 7-8.
116. /d. at 8.
117. See; e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 14-15 (cataloguing myriad foreign
relations power questions left unaddressed in Constitution); REVELEY, supra note 27, at 31-49
(discussing Constitution's "ill-defined, frequently competitive provisions" as well as "gaps in the warpower provisions"). At times, Yoo seems to adopt the "gap theory," at least with respect to the foreign
affairs power. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 24 (acknowledging that significant details regarding foreign
affairs power are absent from Constitution's text).
118. Prakash & Ramsey; supra note 100, at 236.
119. See, e.g.; Yoo, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that British approach to foreign affairs,
constitutional ratification events; and views of Federalists and Anti-Federalists led to understanding in
·e ighteenth century that executive retained "war and treaty powers"); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
100, at 234 (interpreting Article II, Section 1 of Constitution as vesting '"residual' foreign affairs
power" in executive); Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1568 (summarizing textualist position that
executive has "foreign affairs power'' that textually is not allocated elsewhere in Constitution).
120. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 (asserting that executive, under Article II, retains power it once
enjoyed that has not been explicitly delegated elsewhere).
121. /d. at 27.
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allocation of war powers between the executive and the legislature, a consensus
that he finds reflected in these diverse sources:
Both political theory, as primarily developed by thinkers such as
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, and shared Anglo-American
constitutional history from the seventeenth century to the time of the
framing, established that foreign affairs was the province of the
executive branch of government. Thus, when the Framers ratified the
Constitution, they would have understood that Article II, Section I
continued the Anglo-American constitutional tradition of locating the
foreign affairs power generally in the executive branch. 122
According to Y oo, while the Framers understood war and treaty powers to rest
with the executive, they followed the British model in giving the legislature
power over funding so as to check the executive. 123 The management of foreign
relations_thus was "dynamic," based on the interaction between the political
branches. 124
The Frame_rs' understanding of the dynamic relation between the political
branches would be supported, says Yoo, by the political theorists who were. most
widely read and influential at the time. Grotius and Vattel, for example, placed
the foreign relations power in the executive. They recognized that international
agreements that transfer sovereign powers may not be made unilaterally by the
executive but require approval of the legislature. 125 Yoo discusses Locke's -n otion
of executive prerogative, which would permit the executive to act "'without the
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it'" 126 and implies that the
doctrine was incorporated sub silentio into the Constitution. Locke and
Montesquieu both believed that the executive exercised sole power over foreign
affairs through what Locke called the "federative'' power.127 While
Montesquieu recognized legislative checks on executive foreign affairs powerthrough the power of the purse and through its power to disband the armyneither Locke nor Montesquieu envisioned the judicial branch as having any role
in foreign affairs. 128 Blackstone likewise considered "warmaking and
treatymaking powers as part of the royal prerogative," while allowing for
legislative checks through the power of impeachment. 129 Although the British
King seemed to have sovereign control over foreign affairs, during the
eighteenth century, Parliament, through its power over domestic legislation and
'

.

122. /d. at 19.
123. /d. at 30-31.
124. /d. at 31.
125. Yoo, supra note 4, at 34-36.
126. /d. at 37 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 160 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690));see also id. at 44 (discussing Blackstone's version of
notion of executive prerogative, which somewhat alters Locke's theory).
127~ /d. at 37-40 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 126, § 146).
128. /d. at 39-40.
129. YoO,sL~pra note 4, at 44.

2007]

THE FOREIGNAFFAIR:S POWER

265

the power of the purse, exerted "a more direct influence over foreign policy than
the formal allocation of constitutional powers would suggest. " 130
This aspect of Yoo's argument has been criticized in two ways. First, some
scholars simply dismiss the relevance of seventeenth-- and eighteenth-century
political theory and the practice of the British monarchy on the ground that "the
framers consciously departed from so much of it. " 131 It is safe to predict that
Irons would be in this camp, as he provides myriad quotations from the Framers
indicating their hostility to the notion of an executive empowered with war
powers akin to the "prerogative" of English kings. 132 As James Wilson put it,
"'The prerogatives of the British Monarchy' . . . were not 'a proper guide in
defining the executive powers. Some of the prerogatives were of a legislative
nature. Among others that of war and peace.'" 133
Other scholars have objected to Yoo's reading of the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century background as oversimplified and thus incorrect. 134
According to these scholars, Yoo and other textualists have_ postulated a
consensus regarding notions of executive powers where none ex.isted. 135 Michael
Ramsey, Curtis Bradley, and Martin Flaherty review seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century political theory and conclude that there was no consensus
among such theorists as to where the power to make war was to be vested. 136 In
addition, Ramsey points out that the English Constitution was not the only
.

.

.

.

130. /d. at 54 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
131. Cole, supra note 9, at 8; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 572 (criticizing those
who argue for expansive executive powers based on Article Il's Vesting a a use as erring "dramatically
in [the] presumption that America's constitutional practitioners mechanically applied European
political and legal theory").
132. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 20 (noting Charles Pinckney's concern that giving President
responsibility over "'peace and war .•. would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, to
wit an elective onem); id. (noting John Rutledge's opposition to "'giving [the executive] the power of
war and peace"'); id. (noting James Madison's view that "'executive powers ... do not include the
rights of war and peace ... but should be confined and defined if large we should have the evils of
elected Monarchies'").
133. /d. (quoting James Wilson, who spoke against incorporating British government into U.S.
Constitulion).
134. See Bradley & Flaherty,. supra note 62, at 572 ("[E]xecutive-power essentialists have painted
too simplistic a picture of the relevant eighteenth-century political, constitutional, and legal thought.").
See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) ("Where the interpretivist seeks clarity and
definiteness, the historian finds ambiguity.").
135. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 559 (argu.ing that neither constitutional text nor
historical evidence supports the_o ry that Article II's Vesting Clause can be read as grant of plenary
foreign affairs powers to executive); Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 11, at 1701~ (noting that
history, by itself, cannot shed most meaningful light on what constitutional text signifies).
136. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 560.;71 (canvassing writings of John Locke,
William Blackstone, Baron de Montesquieu, Thomas Rutherforth, Jean de Lolme, Jean Jacques
Burlamaqui, Samuel Puffendorf, Hugo Grotius, and Emmerich de Vattel and finding no consensus on
which branch of government should wield foreign affairs powers); Ramsey, Text and History, supra
note 71, at 1701-02 & n.58 (arguing that Yoo constructs argument of historical inevitability based on
"selective emphasis'; and that none of leading historians on whom Yoo relies has endorsed his view of
executive war powers).
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model that influenced the Framers. The Roman Republic was also a significant
model, and under that system, at least in theory, the power to initiate war was
vested in the legislature. 137
2. State Constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and the Ratification
Debates

Yoo's account of the significance of state constitutions during the
revolutionary period is heavily indebted to the work of Gordon Wood. 138
Wood's argument, as summarized by Yoo, is that the American colonists were
chastened when their early experiments in increased democracy "produced
chaos, leading some states to adopt admired constitutions that returned power to
the executive branch." 139 While Thomas Jefferson advocated reining in executive
power in state constitutions, John Adams's approach prevailed. Yoo concludes:
While the Revolution may have represented a rebellion against the
presence of the Crown, it was not an assault on the traditional
relationship between the executive and legislature. As under the royal
governors, the common practice of the states. either assumed that the
governors had broad warmaking authority, or explicitly gave them such
power in terms reminiscent of the British constitution and the colonial
charters. 140
South Carolina's Constitution, which imposed substantive limitations on
executive war powers; was an exception; 141 but according to Yoo, this exception
"underscores the common presumption that such powers lay with the
executive. " 142
Here, as in other con texts, Y oo argues by negative implication: "If the
Framers had wanted to prevent the president from commencing war without
congressional approval, ... they could have adopted a provision not unlike South
Carolina's. '' 143 But that argument is unconvincing, as one could also point to

137. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note. 71, at 1699~1700 (discussing influence of Roman
Republic and John Adams's writings on Roman Constitution, which demonstrate that "at least in
theory," Roman legislature controlled declarations of war).
138. See, e.g., Yoo,supra note 4, at 29 (citing work of Wood, Bernard Bailyn, Forrest McDonald,
and Jack Rakove as sources for his understanding of intellectual context of Revolution); id. :at 36
(following Wood's and Bailyn's views on influence of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone on
revolutionary generation)~
139. Yoo; War an,d the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1648; see also Yoo,supra note 4, at 63
(asserting similar argument that states chose to sustain ''the executive's traditional powers" as opposed
to distributing power structurally).
140. Yoo,supra note 4, at 65.
141. See id. at 72 (noting that South Carolina was only state to substantively limit war power of
exe.c utive).
142. /d. at 86.
143. /d. at 72; see also id. at 148 ("If the Framers had intended to grant Congress the power to
commence military hostilities, they could easily have imported the phrase from the Articles of
Confederation into the Constitution, as they did with other, related powers."); Yoo, supra note 4, at
153 ("If the Framers had sought to establish a system that requires ex ante congressional approval ....
Article II, Section 2 should have included an additional clause that the president 'shall have Power, by

2007]

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

267

express language granting state governors war powers, which the Framers did
144
not incorporate into the Constitution~
Nor did they adopt language from
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation and grant the President "the sole and
exclusive right and power of deterrnining on peace and war."145
Moreover, Yoo's argument that there was a "common presumption" that
war powers lay with the executive is undercut by his own narrative, which
indicates that the issue was a subject of considerable debate. That being the case,
one cannot blithely fill lacunae in the Constitution with a presumption in favor of
executive authority.146 In any case, Y oo fails to demonstrate that colonial
charters and state constitutions reflect in an intelligible way on the emerging
sense among the Framers of the proper allocation of war powers on the federal
level. Yoo provides no evidence that state. constitutional experience played any
determinative role in the ratification debates over war powers. He gives no
consideration to the possibility that Anti-Federalist fear of a centralized federal

and with the advice and consent of Congress, to engage in War.'''). One reviewer of Yoo's work has
criticized such arguments by negative implication as '"when the dog doesn't bark' statements." David
J. Bederman, Recent Books on International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 490,492 (2006) (reviewing Yoo,
supra note 4). Bederman points out that Yoo ignores arguments by negative imp1ication that would
undercut his pQsition that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing. Bederman concludes,
"Yoo's dog is well trained; itbarks only on his command." Id.
144. One example is New Hampshire's 1784 constitution:
The president ... shall have full power by himself~ or by any chief commander, or other
officer,-or officers ..• to train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia and navy; and for the
special defence and safety of this state to assemble in martial ,a rray, and put in warlike
posture, the. inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter,
expulse, repel, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within and
without the limits of this state; and also to kill slay, destroy, if necessary~ and conquer by all
fitting ways, enterpriz~ and means, all ~nd every such person and persons as shall, at any
time hereafter, in a hostile manner, attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion,
detriment, or annoyance of this state ....
N.H. CONST. pt. II (1784), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2463-64 (Frances Ne,w ton Thorpe ed., 1909).
Massachusetts's 1780 constitution was nearly identical. MASS. CONST. ch. II, § 1, art. VII, reprinted in 3
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 0TIIER ORGANIC LAWS,
supra, at 1901.
145. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1777). Yoo's discussion of the Articles of
Confederation is riddled with baffling contradictions. The Articles pose a problem for Y oo, since
under the Articles all national powers were vested in the Continental Congress. See Yoo, supra note 4,
at 73 (noting that "the Articles vested all national powers in the Continental Congress, including those
over war and peace"). But one should not think of the Continental Congress as a legislature, says Yoo;
it was in fact the national government's executive branch. /d. at 74. "Legislative powers even in the
foreign affairs arena remained with the state assemblies.', /d. (emphasis added}. On the same page,
however,- Yoo states that "the Articles transferred all foreign affairs powers to the Continental
Congress." ld. (emphasis added). On the next page, Yoo states that nthe Congress exercised a mixture
of judicial, legislative-, and executive functions." /d. at 75.
146. Yoo has argued that because Article Irs Vesting Oause is not limited in the way Article I's
Vesting aause is, "any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature, such as the.
power to conduct military hostilities, must be resolved in favor of the executive branch.'' Yoo, War
and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1677. But no such resolution ·is possible if the presumption
in favor of executive war powers did not obtain in the eighteenth century.
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government would lead the Framers to constrain federal exe_cutive powerespecially in the area of war making in ways they did not think necessary with
respect to state executive power. In fact, the Framers freely and repeatedly
expressed their desires to minimize executive war powers.l47
The historical record on the eighteenth-century view of executive power is
confused enough to permit differing conclusions. Martin Flaherty and Curtis
Bradley review the experience of the American states in the revolutionary and
critical periods. 148 They find no evidence to support the thesis that people
steeped in political theory of the framing period would simply assume executive
control over the powers of war and peace. 149 Rather, Flaherty and Bradley argue
that when some states moved "to enhance the independence and authority of the
executive branch, " 150 they did so not because they thought that certain powers
were inherently executive in nature but for the pragmatic reason of providing a
check on the legislature. Tbe actual allocation of executive power was, say
Flaherty and Bradley, "specific and functional rather than categorical and
essentialist. " 151
Yoo chastises John Hart Ely, Harold Koh, and Jack Rakove for ignoring
the ratification debates. 152 But Y oo's use of these debates appears selective, and
the selection tendentious. Y oo contends that, since the ratifiers did not have
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, they had to rely on "the
background of Anglo-American political and constitutional history of the
preceding century," which featured not "the enfeebled governors of many of the
early state constitutions ... [but] a rejuvenated presidency." 153 The result, Yoo
claims, is a Constitution in which "the president played the primary role in war
and a significant, if not primary, role in determining peace. Customary executive
power over foreign affairs had returned to a unitary, energetic executive, but one
that took the form of a republican president rather than a hereditary
monarch. " 154
This argument is based in part on 'Yoo's claim that Virginia was the "key
state" in the ratification process, and thus, that the debate there "powerfully
suggests what original meaning we should attach to the relative roles of the
president, Senate, and Congress in wielding the foreign affairs power. " 155 As a
political matter, it is true that without ratification in Virginia, the constitutional

147. See supra_notes 67-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of various Framers' views of
limiting executive powers.
148. Bradley &_Flaherty, supra note 62, at 571-85.
149. /d. at 581 (noting that the "pattern [in state constitutions] -strong legislatures and limited
and defined executive powers extended to foreign affairs").
150. /d. at 584.
151. /d. at 585.
152. Yoo,supra note 4, at 106-07.
153. /d. at 107.,
154. Id. at 107-08.
155. /d. at 140-41.
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enterprise would have been shaky if not doomed. 156 It is also the case that the
Virginia debate featured an extraordinary collection of both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists and a rousing debate on war powers. Still, given Yoo's
contractarian views on the significance of the ratification debates, 157 it is peculiar
for him to argue that the tenth state to ratify should have some decisive role in
determining the meaning of the Constitution. After all, the other participants in
the ratification process were no more privy to the Virginia ratification debates
than they were to Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention.
In any case, with respect to war powers, Yoo's discussion of the debates
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists seems to miss the point. AntiFederalists criticized the draft Constitution on the ground that it gave too much
power to the executive. 158 The Federalists' response was not to defend the
unitary executive but to highlight the limits of executive power under the
Constitution. 159 Yoo contends that, in the war powers debate, the Federalists
engaged in a conscious "strategy of exaggerating the British King's powers and
intentionally distorting Anti-Federalist arguments . " 160 As Jack Rakove has
noted, however, one can recognize the political and rhetorical context in which
various statements were made without dismissing "all statements on either side
of the question as so much propaganda.." 161 The ratification debates strongly
suggest that neither Federalists nor Anti-Federalists favored an expansive
executive. 162 They differed only in their estimation of how successfully the
Constitution had fettered that branch of the federal government.
•

156. See id. at 131-32 (citing views of Alexander Hamilton and Forrest McDonald on importance
of ratification .in Virginia).
157. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 107 (arguing that ratification debates "carr~ed the greatest polit~cal
1
legitimacy ' and forced Federalists "to explain the meaning of specific constitutional provisions and
how they would work").
158. See id. at 111 (''To Anti-Federalists, both president and king held the same powers over wat
and peace, and thus threatened the same tyranny."). An interesting1 though different, take was that of
Patrick Henry in the "key" Virginia ratification debates. Henry criticized the Constitution on the
ground that it gave Congress all war powers. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS

at 172 (1.836) (''' The
Congress can both declare war and carry it on, and levy your money, as long as you have a shilling to
pay/'). Henry clearly did not share Yoo's assumptions about war powers being inherently executive in
nature.
159. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that Federalists in New York ratification debate
"stressed the fonnal differences between the American and British plans of government," contrasting
"powers of the king, and the relative weakness of the president").
160. /d.
161. RAKOVE,supra note 113, at 17.
162. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, at 1712 (noting that when Anti-.Federalists
complained about scope of presidential authority, "Federalists responded by saying that the
President's powers were not as great as the Anti-Federalists supposed").
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,
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B.

Yoo's Textual Analysis

Because he thinks an expansive reading of Congress's war powers is
inconsistent with the notion of executive power as understood in the eighteenth
century, Yoo rejects the traditional perspe-c tive's textual argument regarding
congressional war powers. His textual argument has two components an
expansive reading of Article II's Vesting Clause and a narrow reading of Article
I's enumeration of congressional war powers.
Yoo's argument in favor of executive war powers is simple and
straightforward. Because the Constitution states that "executive power shall b'e
vested" in the President, the best way to understand the constitutional text is as a
grant of all executive powers, as those powers would have been understood in
the eighteenth century. 163 Since Yoo argues that informed people at the time of
the Constitution's ratification would have assumed that foreign affairs powe'rs
are executive in nature, "Article II effectively grants to the president any
unenumerated foreign affairs powers not given elsewhere to the other
branches. " 164 For the reasons given in Part III.A.l; supra, this Essay has argued
that Y oo's reading of Article Il's Vesting Clause is unpersuasive. 165
Yoo is at his most brilliant in fashioning creative textual and structural
arguments for a narrow reading of congressional war powers. Here too, however,
the arguments, while interesting, are not convincing enough to overcome the
clear statements of the Framers and the-practice of the early republic, both of
which uniformly suppor.t congressional primacy in decision-making processes
relating to the advent of hostilities.

163. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) ("The
executive power was given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed ....~');
Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, GAZE'I"I'E U.S., June 29, 1793, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969) ("The general doctrine_then of :o ur
constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the
exceptions and qu[a}lifications which are expressed in the instrument."). The difference between the
Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses has recently been called into question. See Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein; The President and the Administration, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 47-50 (1994) (arguing
that Vesting Clause of Article_ II implicitly includes "herein granted" provision similar to that of
Vesting Qause of Article I). For an extended refutation of Lessig and Sunstein and a defense of the
theory of a unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
164. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18.

165. In addition to the historical arguments of Bradley and Flaherty discussed supra, those
opposing the Vesting Oause thesis have telied on Justice Jackson~s opinion in the Steel Seizure case:
"[I]t is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some
trifling ones." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co .. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 64041 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). In the same vein, Bradley and Flaherty explain that ''the Founders' decision
to list what they meant by 'executive Power' would tend to suggest, pursuant to the expressio unius
canon, that their list was complete, rather than merely illustrative." Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62,
at 555.
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Yoo focuses his discussion of Article I on the Declare War Clause. He has
very little to say about Congress's other enumerated powers. 166 Relying on
Samuel Johnson's English dictionary, Yoo concludes that the phrase "declare
war" connotes "recogniz[ing] a state of affairs· ·clarifying the legal status of the
nation's relationship with another country rather than authoriz(ing] the
creation of that state of affairs. " 167 Y oo then professes puzzlement at the·
different language used in Article I, Section 8, which grants Congress the power
to "declare War,'' and in Article I, Section 10, which provides that the states may
not "engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay." 168 Yoo points out that the language in Section 10 creates
precisely the allocation of war powers "between Congress and the states" that
the traditional perspective would like to establish "between Congress and the
president. " 169 This shows the difficulties of the traditional approach, says Yoo,
"because it requires us to believe that the Framers did not know how to express
themselves in one part of the Constitution but did in another part of the
Constitution on exactly the same subject. " 170
There is a methodological difficulty here because Yoo's reading of the
Declare War Clause treats it in isolation and thus ignores an important element
of the constitutional structure, which grants Congress numerous war powers.171
But it is not really so hard to imagine why the Framers would prefer "declare" in
Article 1, Section 8 but "engage~' in Article 1, Section 10. The Constitution
provides that the states have no power to declare war, but also that they may not
engage in war, unless in response to an invasion. Parallel construction could not
have achieved the desired effect here without significantly infringing on the
President's power to repel sudden attacks that do not rise to the level of
invasion. 172
In addition, Yoo himself provides two strong arguments for the choice of
"declare" in Article 1, Section 8. First, Yoo recognizes that "in times of declared
war, certain actions by the federal government would survive strict scrutiny but

166. Yoo provides a brief discussion of "letters of marque and reprisal'' and concludes that they
refer only to "one species of commercial warfare." Yoo, supra note 4, at 147-48.
167. /d. at 145 (citing 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICl'IONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W.
Strahan ed., 1755)). Michael Ramsey reads Johnson's dictionary as permitting a broader
understandi11;g of "declare'' to include "to· 'make known''' through action. See Ramsey, T~tualism,
.
.
supra note· 71, at 1590-91 (interpreting definition of "declare" as including declaration of war "by
action" as well as "by proclamation"). David Cole points out that, even in the eighteenth century, the
phrase: "declare war" was a legal term of art referring to "both the commencement of hostilities and ..
. officially recognizing that war was ongoing." Cole, supra note 9, at 9.
168. Yoo,supra note 4,at 146 (quoting U.s~ CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 3).
169. ld
170. ld.
171. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text outlining constitutional provisions granting
various powers to Congress pertaining t.o war.
172. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, at 1706-07 (arguing that, because restrictions
on President's war powers are not same as restrictions on states' war powers, the different language in
two clauses is perfectly reasonable).
•
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would certainly fail if attempted in peacetime. " 173 Thus, even if Congress's
power to declare war does not constrain the executive's powers as commander in
chief, it does constrain the President and hold him to his oath to defend the
Constitution and implement the laws of the United States. States have no such
power, and so the word "declare" has no place in Article 1, Section 10.
Second, Yoo's discussion of the Declaration of lndependence 174 illustrates
how the efficacy of congressional declarations of war could go beyond mere
recognition of an existing state of war. The Declaration, Yoo tells us, "did not
'authorize' military resistance to Great Britain." 175 Rather, it "announced the
legal relationship between the mother country and its former colonies." 176 It is
not surprising that the Declaration did not create a state of war between Great
Britain and its former colonies. Its purpose was to declare independence, not
war. What is noteworthy is that Yoo recognizes that the effect of the Declaration
was not merely declaratory but transformative: "The Declaration's importance
was not in authorizing combat, but in transforming the legal status of the
hostilities between Great Britain and her colonies from an insurrection to a war
between equals. " 177
As speech-act theory has long ,recognized, certain utterances are
"performative. " 178 Such utterances create states of affairs rather than reporting
or commenting on them. 179 Thus, Yoo recognizes that a congressional
declaration of war could do more than merely grant official recognition to a
preexisting condition; it could bring about a new state of affairs, one with both
legal and political ramifications.
Just as scholars who have undertaken historical research with a
thoroughness that rivals Yoo's have disputed the accuracy of his arguments
regarding eighteenth-century views of executive power, 180 such scholars have
similarly disputed Yoo's arguments reg~rding the meaning of the Declare War
Clause. In a lengthy article, Michael Ramsey looks not only to Grotius, Vattel,

173. Yoo, supra note 4, at 151. In the book, Yoo does not explain how a declaration of war
permits Congress to pass laws that it could not otherwise pass. In an earlier work, he has cited the
notorious Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), decision as the sole support for his
contention that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group may be justified
by (p]ressing public necessity." Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1673 n.l02
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). But see Ramsey, Text and History,
supra note 71, at 1692-93 (acknowledging possibility that governmental powers increase during
wartime, though stating that "augmentation turns upon the war itself, not upon the proclamation").
174. Yoo,supra note 4, at 149-50.
175. /d. at 149.
176. /d. at 150.
177. /d.
178. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 6 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbsia eds.,
Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1975) (1962).
179. /d. Austin provides some familiar examples: Saying "I do" in the context of a marriage
ceremony; uttering the words "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth;' while smashing a bottle against
the stem; writing in a will "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"'; and saying "I bet you
sixpence it will rain tomorrow." /d. at 5.
180. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 560-71.
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Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone,- but also to Samuel Puffendorf, Matthew
Hale, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Thomas
Rutherforth, and Christian Wolff. 181 Ramsey demonstrates that eighteenthcentury the-orists used the phrase "declare war" to signify both a formal
proclamation that hostilities existed and the commencement of war through
conduct 182
In a response to Ramsey's article, Yoo takes_Ramsey to task for discussing
political theorists whose influence on the Framers was negligible. 183' Here, Yoo
seems to misunderstand his own textualist project. As Ramsey points out, his
argument that the evidence is conflicting regarding the eighteenth-century
understanding of the phrase "declare war" shifts the burden of proof to Yoo and
other textualists who claim that the phrase "declare war" could only be about
written declarations rather than declarations through action. 184 The textual
advantage shifts to the argument in favor of congressional primacy in decision
making relating to war.
To argue, as Yoo does; that we should ignore theorists to whom the
Framers did not specifically cite in the ratification debates is to return to an
intentionalist approach and to reject the argument that the Constitution means
what an informed eighteenth-century reader would understand it to mean.
Ramsey's approach is truer to the textualist project, but he concludes that the
text itself does not support a narrow interpretation of the Declare War Clause 185
186
and that recourse to extrinsic material is therefore justified. Ramsey contends
that the extrinsic material fully supports the traditional perspective favoring
congressional war powers, and Y oo does not argue otherwise-.187

181. Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1570-96.
182. See id. at 1596 ("There would have been nothing remarkable in using 'declare war' to mecm
initiation of a state of war by sovereign action, as well as by proclamation.")~ Yoo concedes that "some
eighteenth-century writers appeared to use the phrase 'declare war' to mean conimence war." Yoo,
War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1660.
183. See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1645-46 (contending that views of
political theorists whose ideas did not influence framing generation are irrelevant). Ramsey
convincingly argues that Yoo is wrong about the influence of the writers in question and shows lhat
Yoo had in fact relied on the very same writers in some of his earlier work. Ramsey, Text and History,
supra note 71, at 1690-91 & n.21.
184. See Ramsey, Text and History; supra not~ 71, at 1686-87 (arguing that "Declare War Oause .
. . is capable of a broad meaning" and thus Yoo ultimately fails to overcome his burden of proof).
185., See Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1602 ("In sum, the narrow meaning of declaring
war does not proceed as satisfactory an account of the text and structural role of the Declare War
Clause.").
186. See id. at 1569 (discussing usefulness of looking to "views of the drafters and their
contemporaries" to interpret textual meaning, .in order to "cross-check" interpretation).
187. Yoo concedes that "[p)ractice plays an important interpretive role for the question of the
proper allocation of war powers." Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1664; see also
Yoo, supra note 4, at 234 ("While not as relevant as the records of the ratification debates,arguments and events after 1788 cannot have influenced the minds of those who adopted the
Constitution in 1787 postratification evidence can show how the Constitution1s structures worked in
practice."). Significantly, while he provides a discussion of twentieth-century practice; which could not
possibly evidence the original meaning of the Constitution, Yoo does not incorporate a discussion of
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In terms of the range of historical sources that Y oo consults and the
sophistication with which he integrates primary and secondary historical source
materials, ·Y oo's. scholarship is an improvement over that of an earlier generation
of scholars. Yoo is always eager to point out the failings of other legal scholars'
use of history. 188 He acknowledges, however, that scholars such as William
Treanor and Martin Flaherty, who "have brought more sophisticated historical
methodology to the study of foreign affairs questions," nonetheless support the
traditional perspective.189 At the very least, reasonable minds could differ as to
whether the constitutional text, structure, and history support the traditional
view of war powers. And where the text itself is not dispositive, legislative
history and postratification practice provide significant evidence of the text's
original meaning. That evidence overwhelmingly supports the traditional
perspective on war powers.
IV. YOQ'S REVISIONISM AND THE TREATY POWER
Unlike his arguments relating to war powers, Yoo's analysis of the treaty
power does not always favor executive unilateralism. While Yoo strongly
advocates executive power to implement, interpret, and; if necessary, tern1inate
treaties, he insists on a role for Congress in giving treaties domestic effect. Yoo
thus provides an elegant solution to the practical problems raised by our
constitutional separation of powers, which gives the President the power to bind
the United States through treaties but generally favors congressional control of
domestic legislation. Yoo has undertaken impressive research in an attempt to
reconcile constitutional design with constitutional practice in the realm of the
treaty power. It is not surprising that, in defending a view of the Constitution
that accords with his policy prefere-n ces for a strong executive and against thebinding force of international law, Y oo cannot always provide convincing
defenses of his positions based on constitutional text, structure, and history.

A.

Interactions of War Powers and the Treaty Power

Y oo repeatedly states that he relies on "constitutional text, structure, and
history." 190 In fact, it is more accurate to say that be takes a historical approach
to understanding the structure of the Constitution with respect to war powers
and a structural approach to understanding the text of the Constitution with
respect to foreign affairs. History and text play a role in Yoo's views on the
treaty power because his reading of the Article II Vesting Clause underpins all of

arguments and practice in the early republic into his treatment of the question of the constitutional
allocation of war powers.
188. See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1643-48 (criticizing historical
methodology in Ramsey, Te.xtualism, supra note 71); Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 8, at 1171, 1179-91
(criticizing John Hart Ely, Jane Stromseth, and Jules Lobel for their use of "law office history" in legal
scholarship on war powers).
189. Yoo, supra note 4, at 26.
190. /d. at viii, 8; see also id. at 5 (stating that book studies "text, structure, and ratification
history of the Constitution").
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his arguments. i 91 But the main focus here is. on one structural element of the
Constitution separation of powers. Yoo's view is that the President has plenary
powers over foreign affairs while Congress has plenary powers over domestic
legislation. 192 The President thus has the power to make, interpret, implement,
and abrogate treaties. If Congress does not approve of the way the President
exercises those powers, it may use its appropriations or other legislative power to
deny executive decisions domestic effect. 193
Yoo's discussion of treaties begins with a transitional chapter that addresses
the question of whether international treaties can require the United States
either to commit its armed forces to hostilities or to refrain from the use of
force. 194 On the first question, even some supporters. of congressional war
powers have argued that the executive has the power under the UN Charter to
commit the United States to participation in multinational military operations
authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter. 195 Yoo finds the argument
irrelevant as, in his view, the President would have such constitutional authority
even if the UN Charter did not exist. 196 Moreover, based on the example of
congressional inaction in the face of the arguably illegal NATO intervention in
Kosovo authorized by President Clinton, Yoo contends that international law
cannot constrain th,e President in the exercise of his constitutional war powers. 197
Y oo finds '~more interesting and difficult" the question of whether Congress
is constitutionally obligated to support executive~authorized uses of force backed

191. See id. at 183-84 ("Article II's Vesting Cause requires that we construe any ambiguities in
the allocation of executive power in favor of the president.").
192. See, e.g., id. at 18 (describing executive foreign affairs powers as ''plenary"); Yoo, supra
note 4, at 183 (claiming that "the Framers understood the conduct of foreign ,affairs to be executive in
nature, while the legislature controlled funding and domestic regulation").
193. See id. at 293 ("[F]oteign
policy emerges from the interaction of the plenary powers of the
.
different branches of government. Congress may set its powers ov~r funding and legislation against the
president's Article II authorities in war and treatymaking and his structural advantages in wielding
power, or the branches may choose to cooperate to reach foreign policy outcomes.").
194. !d. at 143-81 (Chapter 5: War Powers for a New World).
195. See David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Tran.sformation of
War Powers, 10 U. COLO. L. REv. 1491, 1492-93 (1999) (stating that executive has "unilateral power to
use armed force in United Nations collective security actions," yet asserting that power is restricted on
several bases with Security Counsel sanction playing vital role); Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel,
Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police Action in Lieu of War.;
uThe Old Order Changeth,, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 68, 74 (1991) (arguing that President has power to
commit United States to participation in UN-authorized police actions without congressional
approval). These positions are criticized in D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism that Isn't True? The Tenth
Amendment and Executive War Power, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 135, 169·78 (2001).
196. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 165 ("Because the president already has the domestic
constitutional authority to initiate military hostilities without any authorizing legislation, he need not
rely on treaty obligations for legal justification.").
197. See, e.g., id. at 171 ("In neither Kosovo nor Iraq did international law impose a restraint on
presidential action, nor were federal courts about to enforce treaty obligations so as to restrict the
commander-in-chief power."); id. at 172 ("Kosovo provides a clear demonstration that presidents are
not constitutionally or legally bound by intetnationallaw.").
'
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by UN or NATO resolutions. 198 He notes that Alexander Hamilton favored the
argument for binding Congress to implement U.S. treaty obligations as required
under the Supremacy Clause. 199 Yoo rejects this view, however, as "inconsistent
with the balance struck by the Constitution between the executive and legislative
powers. " 200
In a final section of his chapter on the interaction of war powers and the
treaty power, Yoo recognizes one significant limitation on unilateral executive
war powers. Although he contends that Presidents may freely ignore treaty
obligations in pursuit of policy goals,2°1 in certain circumstances Presidents may
not, in pursuit of policy goals, abide by a treaty requiring the use of force. 202
Specifically, Yoo criticizes President Clinton's willingness to commit American
troops to fight in Kosovo under the command of non-U.S. officers. 203 Yoo makes
a very interesting textual argument, based on an analogy to the Supreme Court's
Appointments Clause jurisprudence, which would seem to require that any
commander of U.S. troops must be approved through the constitutional
appointments process and be accountable to the executive. 204
Yoo's close textual reading is persuasive. If his analogy to the
Appointments Clause is permitted, however, one wonders how U.S .. good-faith
participation in any collective security regime would be possible. Yoo suggests
that U.S. soldiers and officers acting under foreign command must be free to
disobey orders. 205 No military can operate under such conditions, as evidenced
by the punishments, including death, provided under the U.S. Code of Military
Justice for soldiers who disobey their officers.206 In any case, in the unlikely
event that executive authority would be challenged in such a case, it is hard to
see why a court would insist on viewing the U.S. soldiers as serving under foreign
command rather than viewing them as seconded to a NATO or UN force, thus
relieving the President of any constitutional constraints on command.
With respect to other aspects of the interaction of treaty and war powers,
Y oo abandons close textual readings and relies on the loosest form of structural
argumentation. He insists, for example, that legislative power is the main
structural check on executive powers contemplated in the constitutional

198. /d. at 165-66.
199. /d. at 166.
200. Yoo,supra note 4, at 166-67.
201. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for
power.

Yoo~s

argument that the President has such

202. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that external treaty obligations should not affect
executive decision to use force).
203. /d. at 173-77. Yoo calls Clinton's willingness to do so "unprecedented." /d. David Bederman
has shown that, even on Yoo's evidence, it is not. See Bederman, supra note 143, at 494 (noting that
Wilson placed American forces under French strategic command in World War I and that contingents
of Continental Army were under French command during American Revolution).
204. Yoo, supra note 4, at 176-77.
205. /d. at 180 (noting that American commanders at policy, tactical, and strategic levels may
contradict any orders that non-U.S. commanders give).
206. ld. at 336-37 n.73 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-892 (2000)).
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design. 207 But numerous other structural arguments could find support in the text
and history of the Constitution. One could argue that in the context of the treaty
power; Congress's check on executive power is provided through the
requirement that the Senate give its advice and consent. Once it has done so,
Congress is bound to authorize funding for the treaties that have become law of
the land, and it has consented to the participation of U.S. forces in military
engagements authorized under such treaties, even if American soldiers would
thereby be placed under foreign command.
Clearly, one concern here for Yoo is that the judiciary could become
involved in interpreting treaties and thus act as a check on executive foreign
affairs powers. Y oo thinks that such a check "would expand the federal
judiciary's authority into areas where it has little competence, where the
Constitution does not textually call for its intervention, and where it risks
defiance by the political branches. " 208 It is hard to reconcile this contention
either with the. constitutional text, which expressly grants the federal judiciary
power over all cases arising under treaties,209 or with the practice in the early
republic, in which courts quite often interpreted treaties, usually in ways that
undercut the interpretations proffered by the government. 210
Moreover, Yoo's institutional competence argument is hard to square with
his political career. The arm of the executive branch that is entrusted with
interpreting and implementing treaties is the Department of State.21 1 When ·Yoo
was in the Justice Department, however, he clashed with State Department
lawyers about the extent to which the Geneva Conventions would apply to the
war on terror. 212 The Bush administration seems to have relied on the advice of

207. See id. .at 167 (arguing that "Framers believed that the legislative power ... would provide a
crucial constitutional and political check ·on executive power and policies" while treaty· making powers
were executive's alone).
208. /d. at 172.
209. U.S ..CONST. art. III;§ 2, cl.l.
210. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2007) (finding that government lost fourteen of
nineteen federal cases decided between 1789 and 1838 in which treaty questions arose and concluding
that judiciary's lack of deference to executive interpretations of treaties was consistent with Framers'
views).

211. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 'MANUAL 2006/2007, at 298 (2006) (noting that lawyers in Office of Legal
Adviser to Secretary of State "draft, negotiate and interpret treaties [and] international agreements ..
., [and] represent the United States in meetings of international organizations and in international
negotiations .... . [and] before international tribunals"); Website of the Office of the Legal Adviser;
http://www.stat.e~gov/s/l/treaty (last visited June 3, 2007) (setting forth Legal Adviser's role in advising
"other Department bureaus (including posts overseas), and other governmental agencies on all aspects
of treaty law and procedure").
212. William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State under President George W.
Bush, rejected Yoo's arguments that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because
Afghanistan was a "failed state,'~ or because the President has the power under international law to
suspend the United States; treaty commitments. See Unclassified Memorandum from William H. Taft,
IV to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of the Legal Counsel, 4-12 (Jan. 11, 2002),
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Yoo and others in the Justice Department, and not on the State Department, in
determining what forms of interrogation constitute torture under international
law.2 13 In the Hamdan v. Rumsfe[(fl14 case, the Supreme Court sided with the
experts in the State Department and ruled that the Geneva Conventions will
apply to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.2 l 5 When the substance of the nownotorious "torture memos" were leaked to the press in January 2005, the Bush
administration retreated , from its earlier position.216 These episodes hardly
support Yoo's thesis that the executive branch is best positioned to provide
dispositive rulings interpreting treaties.
B.

The Power to Interpret and Terminate Treaties

Yoo contends that the structure of the Constitution suggests that the
President has power to interpret, implement, and abrogate treaties. 217 Because
the Constitution is silent on the subject,218 Yoo again argues by analogy to the
Appointments Clause. As courts have consistently held that the President has
the power to remove from office appointees who must be approved by the
Senate, he must similarly be empowered to implement, interpret, and abrogate
treaties that were approved by the Senate, even if the Senate differs on the
matter. 219
Y oo's contention that the executive has the primary role in implementing
treaties and thus engages on a daily basis in treaty interpretation seems beyond
dispute. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that "[t]he
President has authority to determine the interpretation of an international
agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with .other
220
states. "
The issue is whether the President should act unfettered in the area of
interpretation, implementation, and abrogation, and Yoo here overstates the
':I

available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/OlTaftMemo.pdf [hereinafter Taft

Memo].
213. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L.
& POL'Y 455, 457-58 (2005).
214. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
215. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (ruling that military commissions lacked power to proceed
against petitioners, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, because rules governing such commissions violate
Geneva Conventions).
216. The Justice Department issued a new memo superseding its earlier memo and withdrawing
its statement that "only pain equivalent to such harm as serious physical injury or organ failure
constitutes torture." John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the uTorture Memos," UCBERKELEYNEWS,Jan.
4, 2005, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/medialreleases/2005/01/0S_johnyoo.shtml.
217. Yoo,supra note 4, at 182,..214 (Chapter 6: Interpreting and Ending Treaties).
218. See id. at 182 ("[T]he constitutional text does not explicitly address a host of other questions,
such as those surrounding treaty interpretation and ternrination .... ").
219. ld. at 185-87.
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(1)
(1986).

•
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case for presidential unilateralism. 221 While courts in recent years have tended to
defer to the authority of executive interpretations of treaties, that result is not
constitutionally mandated, as they did not do so in the early republic. 222
Moreover, while Yoo treats Goldwater v. Carter223 as establishing "that any
224
presidential termination of a treaty would be unreviewable in the courts," only
four Justices signed onto the opinion that took that position. 225 Four Justices
rejected that position, and one Justice remained silent.226
Nonetheless, Yoo would give the President a gap-filling role in treaty
227
interpretation akin to the role of courts in interpreting statutes. But unlike
courts interpreting statutes, the executive branch need not concern itself with the
228
Legislative history should not
legislative history of the treaty it interprets.
guide treaty interpretation, Yoo contends, because where treaties must be
approved by two-thirds of the Senate, the on-the-record comments of one
Senator are even less persuasive than in the case of statutes, which require only a
majority vote. 229 This line of argument is extremely difficult to reconcile with
Yoo's insistence, in the context of his arguments about war powers, that the

221. See Taft Memo, supra note 212, at 9 n.16 (calling Yoo's view of executive authority in treaty
matters "somewhat overstated" and noting that "neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court would
agree that the President has plenary power over the interpretation of treaties and of international
law"). Some treaties expressly permit unilateral denunciation, but the default rule is that absent such
express provision or clear evidence that the parties intended to permit unilateral denunciation,
unilateral denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty regime is a breach of international law. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Yoo does not distinguish between withdrawals permitted by international law and withdrawals that
would place the United States in violation of international law.
222. See Sloss, supra note 210, at 1-2 (noting that Supreme Court recently stated that government
agencies' treaty interpretations will be given great weight, but arguing that courts did not defer to
executive in first fifty years of U.S. constitutional development).
223. 444 u.s. 996 (1979).
224. Yoo, supra note 4, at 190.
225.. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
226. See id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Judicial Branch should not decide issues
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach
a constitutional impasse."); id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (voting to "set the case for
oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously deserves"). Yoo's characterization
of Brennan's vote to affirm the D.C. Circuit court's dismissal of the case is misleading. Brennan would
have dismissed on far narrower grounds than the D.C. Circuit's opinion indicated. See id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting application of political question doctrine to case, but voting to affirm based on
President's "well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
governments").
227. Yoo, supra note 4, at 192-93. Curiously, Yoo gives no consideration to the role of
international adjudicatory bodies in interpreting treaties. Treaties routinely provide for dispute
resolution through neutral adjudicatory bodies. His claim that the U.S. executive should have
authority to determine what a treaty means is akin to a rule that one party to a contract should have
authority to determine what the contract means.
228. Yoo argues against the authority of legislative history generally. See id. at 196 ("[T]he use of
legislative history expands the judicial function beyond its proper boundaries.").
229. /d.
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ratification debates provide the most decisive evidence of the Constitution's
original meaning. 230
There are three major problems with Yoo's argument on treaty
interpretation. First, Y oo's Appointments Clause analogy fails because
appointments and treaties are fundamentally different. Under the Supremacy
Clause,231 a treaty, once enacted, is law, and under the Take Care Clause,232 the
President is bound to execute the laws. An appointment is not law and binds no
one, by operation of law. Yoo's argument hinges on his belief that the President
is free to breach treaties as a matter of constitutional law, a position that is hard
to square with the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause.
Second, despite those constitutional clauses, Y oo gives no consideration to
the internationally and domestically recognized mechanisms for treaty
interpretation that are inconsistent with his views. International law requires
giving effect to the intentions of the parties as embodied in the treaty's text, read
in the context of the treaty's legislative history, and with an eye to the treaty's
object and purpose. 233 Courts generally recognize this approach as part of U.S.
law.234
Finally, Yoo attempts to defend his call for executive unilateralism in treaty
interpretation with an appeal to democratic populism, calling the President the
"head of the most democratically accountable branch in the national
government" and maintaining that "the people can hold the president directly
accountable for his interpretation of a treaty. " 235 First, it is certainly not the case
that the executive branch is more democratically accountable than the
legislature. Other than the President, no member of the executive branch is
democratically accountable at all.236 Moreover, even the President is not directly
elected and also is not generally subject to dismissal for one or even for a series
230. Curiously, Yoo relies on legislative history to defend his arch·textualism; "Part of the reason
that the Framers established the two-thirds supermajority requirement for treaties was to render
treaties difficult to make and to protect the interests of the states." /d. at 196.
231. See U.S. CaNST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 11Ulde, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " (emphasis added)).
232. See id. art. II, § 3 (requiring that President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
233. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, sup·ra note 221, arts. 31-32.
234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 325
cmt. a (1986) (noting that, while Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has not come into force
for United States, "it represents generally accepted principles and the United States has also appeared
willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis''); see also, e.g., Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 396, 400-03 (1985) (considering legislative history in interpreting Warsaw Convention
relating to air transportation).
235. Yoo,supra note 4, at 198.
236. In another section of the book, Yoo indicates that the process of approving treaties and
international agreements could be made more democratic if Congress were bypassed entirely and the
President were pennitted to make such agreements alone. In support of this argument, Yoo contends
that "the president ... (aside from the vice president) is the Of\e federal officer chosen by the entire
electorate.'; /d. at 258. It is hard to imagine that, for example Dan Quayle, was "chosen by the entire
electorate" to serve as Vice President.
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of constitutional missteps. In any case, when it suits his argument, Y oo argues
that the House of Representatives is "the most directly democratic part of the
government,"237 a statement more in keeping with the constitutional design.

C.

Self-Executing and Non-Self~ Executing Treaties

Y oo's structural approach to constitutional interpretation, which focuses on
separations of foreign affairs powers and legislative powers, leads him to
conclude that treaties must be presumptively non-self-executing~ 238 Otherwise,
Yoo contends, legislative powers would be transferred to the executive and
"treatymakers could regulate any area that lies within Article I's enumerated
powers."239 Yoo here seeks to protect from executive encroachment not only
congressional legislative powers but also the federalist principle embodied in the
Tenth Amendment.240
Yoo's separation of powers argument here seems weak. If Congress's
appropriations power is sufficient to check executive war powers, why should a
structural interpretation of the Constitution not permit the same check on
executive treaty powers? Indeed, as Yoo acknowledges, Congress's ability to
override a treaty through subsequent legislation is recognized under the "last-intime" doctrine. 241 In any case, as Yoo knows from his own experience in the
Justice Department, whether the Framers envisioned a strict separation between
executive and legislative power, the reality is that the executive branch plays a

237. /d. at 224. Elsewhere, Yoo calls the House "the most democratic body of government," id. at
240, and calls Congress "the most popular branch of government." ld. at 244. Later, lte varies the
theme, calling the House "the most popular part of the government" and referring to Congress and
the executive as "the most democratic branches." Yoo,supra note 4, at 257.
238. See id. at 217 (arguing that non-self-execution "harmonizes treaties with constitutional
structure and maintains the important distinction between foreign relations and domestic
lawmaking"). See generally id. at 21549 (Chapter 7: Treaties and the Legislative Power) (discussing
Congress's role in formation of treaties).
239. /d. at 218. As David Bederman has pointed out, Yoo's argument is rendered a bit confusing
because he does not distinguish between self-execution that is, the notion that treaties automatically
become U.S. law without congressional jmplementation and the question of whether a treaty gives
rise to a private right of action enforceable in court. Bederman, supra note 143, at 494. For example,
Yoo argues that neither the Constitution nor statutes are self-executing because not all rights arising
under a statute give rise to a private right of action. Yoo, supra note 4, at 226; see also id. at 229
(associating self-execution with court enforcement of treaties).
240. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 221 ("Self-execution also would free the treatymakers and their
legislative power from federalism limitations.").
241. /d. at 225-26. One would expect Yoo to object to the last-in-time doctrine on the ground that
it permits Congress to control foreign affairs. The fact that Yoo objects to it only to the extent that it
permits a treaty to override a statute, id. at 226, suggests that his primary concern is not to defend a
structural understanding of the Constitution, but to limit the impact of treaties as binding U.S. law.
Yoo goes so far as to state that "Coilgres~, under the last..in-time rule, also has the power to terminate
treaties." /d. at 209. This is incorrect. Congress can override a treaty as a matter of domestic law, but
as a matter of international law, Congress has no power to affect the United States' treaty obligations
or to terminate those obligations.
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central role in setting the legislative agenda and even in drafting legislation.242
The strict separation between treaty powers and domestic legislative powers that
Y oo asserts is part of the constitutional structure is nowhere to be found in
constitutional practice.
Moreover, Yoo is in this case inattentive to relevant textual and historical
evidence that provides an alternative structural solution to the separation of
powers problem that he identifies. As Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have
shown, the Constitution grants the Senate power not only to consent to treaties
but also to provide '~advice" in relation te treaties. 243 Early practice suggests that
both George Washington and the Senate believed that the Senate had
constitutional power to advise the President as part of the tre-a ty-making
process. 244 Practice has moved away from this original understanding of the
Constitution, but Yoo might explore reviving the practice in order to reconcile
constitutional practice with text, structure, and history. Still, Yoo seems here to
be taking his separation of powers principles to extremes. By assuming that
treaties are non-self-executing, Yoo would rob the executive of its power to
make binding federal law through the treaty process.
Yoo's federalism concerns are more interesting in this context. In Missouri
v. Holland, 245 the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate migratory
birds through legislation passed pursuant to a bilateral treaty even if Congress
would have lacked the power to regulate absent a treaty. 246 As Yoo
acknowledges, given the subsequent expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers, "there can be little doubt that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act would be
constitutional without the need of a treaty" today. 247 Still Yoo thinks that the
case illustrates the "textual and structural difficulties created by the theory of
self-execution'' because it gives the federal government a way to legislate in
areas in which the Tenth Amendment would otherwise prevent such
legislation.248

242. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
931, 983-1005 (1999} (chronicling presidential control of budget process since 1974). Yoo has argued
that the Supreme Court read Congress's post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), too_narrowly in Hamdan. Yoo claims that he had a hand in drafting
the legislation and that he wrote it to grant the execUtive as broad an authorization as possible. Adam
Liptak, The Court Enters the War, Loudly, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at 1.
243. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting President power to make treaties "with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate"); Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 631 (noting that Founders
seemed to envision that Senate would possess advisory role "beyond a mere affrrmative or negative
vote").
244. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 634 ("[B]oth the Senate and the President
understood that the Senate would consult with the President and give the President advice before
treaties were finalized.").
245. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
246. -Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States.").
247. Yoo,supra note 4, at 222~23.
248. ld. at 223.
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For Yoo, the solution is to treat treaties as non-self-executing, requiring_
249
congressional implementation.
But since Holland involved a challenge to
implementing legislation, Yoo's solution would not address the issue. Rather,
what Yoo must really want is a reversal of Holland and a rule that Congress's
powers to implement treaties through legislation are coextensive with the Article
I, Section 8 enumeration. Y oo presents good structural and practical arguments
for why Holland undermines federalism,250 but David Golove has provided
exhaustive historical and textual arguments supporting the decision,251 to which
Y oo offers no response,. It is hard to see why structure should trump text and
history in this instance.
Indeed, Yoo's arguments on the self-execution of treaties have been
criticized generally as being without support in the historical record.252 Jack
Rakove concludes that "the framers were virtually of one mind" in assuming that
the Supremacy Clause's statement that treaties are "supreme Law" meant that
they were self-executing and enforceable in both state and federal courts. 253 For
both Rakove and Yoo, this unity of mind among the Constitution's drafters
would not be dispositive if the ratification debates indicated a different "original
understanding" of the Constitution. Martin Flaherty, however, has carefully
scrutinized the ratification debates on this subject and concluded that "[i]f
anything, the debates demonstrate that the Antifederalists had put the nation on
notice about the consequence of self-executing treaties and that the requisite
majorities of We the People ratified the proposal anyway."254
D.

Treaties and Other Inte-rnational Agreements

In his final chapter on the treaty power, Yoo argues against the
interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements and
against treaty exclusivity that is, the notion that Article II's Treaty Clause
provides the only lawful mechanism whereby the Untied States can enter into

249. ld.
250. See id. (arguing that almost limitless power accorded to treaty makers under Holland is
inconsistent with principle that federal government is one of limited powers).
251. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1314 (2000) (defending decision in
Holland and hailing it as "one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of the constitutional law of
foreign affairs"). But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HA.Rv. L. REv.
1868, 1875 (2005) (criticizing Holland as wrongly decided and arguing that Louis Henkin's historical
defense of Holland is based on false premise).

252. See Flaherty, supra note 112, at 2120-51 (reviewing records of Constitutional Convention
and ratification debates and finding them to support notion that treaties were to be presumptively selfexecuting); Vazquez, supra note 113, at 2161 (contending that not one "shred of evidence,'-' exists that
anyone intended to allow House of Representatives authority "to block compliance with treaties
already in force").
253. Jack Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Tteatyma/dng Clause as a Case Study, 1
PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984). Yoo's response to the argument based on the Supremacy Oause is
that it is a federalist clause that does not address separation of powers. Yoo, supra note 4, at 230.
254. Flaherty, supra note 112; at 2127.
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international agreements. 255 Instead, Yoo would require that the United States
enter into international agreements pursuant to Article II's treaty provisions "for
regulating subjects that rest outside of Congress's Article I powers" and "in
areas that are the subject of the concurrent powers of the executive and
legislative branches." 256 But congressional-executive agreements are permissible
''in areas such as international trade and finance, where any international
agreement would require [congressional] cooperation for implementation
anyway. ,257
.

.

Y oo maintains that there is no "convincing textual or structural support'' for
treating congressional-executive agreements as interchangeable with Article II
treaties. 258 He rejects the textual readings offered by Myres McDougal, Bruce
Ackerman, and David Golove, 259 as well as the judicial precedent-based
arguments of McDougal and others.260 Since he sees these arguments as flawed,
Yoo concludes that the real reason scholars support permitting the United States
to enter into congressional executive agreements is prudential. 261 But the
"interchangeability" argument is unacceptable to Yoo because it distorts the
constitutional structure by weakening the "president's formal foreign affairs
powers. " 262 Indeed, Y oo's arguments against interchangeability are powerful.
Full interchangeability would permit "Congress to pursue its own foreign policy"
and deprive Presidents of their power to terminate treaties unilaterally, unless
we want to allow an exception to the general rule that Presidents cannot override
a statute in cases whete the statute in question is an international agreement.263
Moreover, if we accept the claim that the federal government can do more
pursuant to its treaty powers than Congress can do pursuant to the Article I
enumeration, interchangeability would permit Congress to expand its legislative

255. Yoo, supra note 4, at 250-92 (Chapter 8: Law as Treaties? Statutes as International
Agreements).
256. I d. at 253.
257.
Jd. at 274.
.
. .
258. /d. at 253.
259. Id. at 253-56 (citing Bruce Ackerman & David M. Golove, Is NAfTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 811 (1995); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 13 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1791, 1808-14 (1998); Myers S. McDougal & Asher Lans,. Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments _of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 203-06
(1945)).
260. Yoo, supra note 4, at 256-57 (citing EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE CONSTITU110N AND WORLD
ORGANIZATION 43-46 (1944); McDougal & Lans, supra note_259, at 261-90; Quincy Wright, The
United States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342-45 (1944)). Yoo also rejects
Bruce Ackerman and David Golove"s argument that the permissibility of congressional-executive is
established through a constitutional transformation that occurred as part of an in.formal amendment
process associated with the New Deal. Jd. at 260-64.
261. See id. at 257 ("Congressional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what
was seen as an outmoded method for dealing witb international affairs with a more efficient,
democratic process.").
262. /d. at 270.
263. /d. at 271.
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power in ways that would undermine both the separation of powers and
federalism.264
Yoo is far more sympathetic to arguments that the Article II treaty process
should be the exclusive means by which the United States enters into
international agreements. 265 In his view, this "exclusivist" argument fails,
however, because it confuses U.S. sovereignty as a matter of international law
with domestic sovereignty. It would pertnit the federal government to bind state
and local governments through international agreements in a way that cannot b'e
reconciled with federalist principles.266 Thus, for example, when the United
States agreed to certain World Trade Organization ("WTO'.' ) provisions, it
remained free to choose how and whether to live up to the WTO's requirements,
and no WTO body could order one of the states to abide by its regulations. 267
Yoo is certainly correct about the WTO, but it is hard to see how the point
relates to treaty exclusivity.
While Y oo's case against interchangeability is multivalent and consistent
with his structural approach, his argument against treaty exclusivity seems
undertheorized, Yoo is correct that if exclusivity were embraced, "about 90
percent of the international agreements m~de by the United States since World
War II would be invalid." 268 But such prudential arguments should count for
little if the object is to be true to constitutional text, structure, and history. The
Constitution provides for a treaty process. It does not contemplate an
alternative. This is not to say that we should abandon congressional-executive
agreements, but only to point out that Yoo has not offered a satisfactory
constitutional argument against treaty exclusivity. In addition, given the focus on
separation of powers in Yoo's structural approach, one would think he would be
concerned with sole executive agreements, which bypass entirely the
constitutionally ordained role of the Congress in treaty making. But Yoo barely
mentions sole executive agreements and relegates to a footnote discussion of
Nixon's use of such an instrument to terminate the Vietnam War.269
.

E.

.

.

.

.

Conclusion: Balancing Executive Power and International Law

The second half of Yoo's book contains a series of arguments about the
treaty power, all of which purport to derive from his view that the constitutional
design calls for a strict separation between foreign affairs powers, which are
exercised by the President, and legislative powers, which belong to Congress.
Despite the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause, Yoo does not seem to
recognize treaty law or international law as meaningful constraints on the

264. Yoo, supra note 4, at 271-73.
265. See id. at 264-66 (favorably discussing Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221
(1995)).
266. I d. at 266-69.
267. Id. at 268-69.
268. /d. at 269.
269. Yoo,supra note 4, at 285 & n.58.
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President. Thus, Yoo believes that the President is free to implement, interpret,
and terminate treaties in a manner consistent with the interests of the United
States as he perceives them. 270 Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela has suggested that
what Yoo calls "revisionism" is more aptly described as a "school" of
"Nationalist International Law," 271 and a nationalist approach is very clear in
Yoo's rejection, in the context of his discussion of the treaty power, of the
efficacy of international law.
Yoo promotes the notion that treaties be presumptively non-self-executing,
lest the executive treaty power encroach on legislative powers in the domestic
arena. Congressional-executive agreements are permissible only in those
substantive areas within Congress's Article I powers. In this way, Congress will
not be permitted to use the treaty power to encroach on the executive's foreign
affairs power, nor will it be permitted to broaden the scope of its legislative
powers at the expense of the states and the people. At the same time, the
executive's foreign affairs power will always be subject to a legislative check, as
congressional implementation will always be required, whether the United States
enters into an international agreement by treaty or by statute. 272
This Part has argued that Yoo's arguments on the treaty power, which are
generally inventive, sophisticated, and well-researched, and many of which are
persuasive, are nonetheless burdened with a methodological eclecticism that
renders suspect his commitment to developing an interpretation that is true to
constitutional text, structure, and history. B_u t one cannot simply conclude, as
some have, that Yoo's aim is to expand executive power at all costs. 273 Yoo is
genuinely concerned that the federal government's treaty-making power be
constrained and answerable to the political institutions most directly accountable
to the American people.
While Yoo is committed to an expansive view of executive power, a view
that permits the President to act aggressively in pursuit of the national interest,
he also warns against permitting any branch of the federal government to be
empowered to bind the United States to abide by international law. 274 Yoo
would not subordinate national security to the United States' commitments
under the UN Charter to refrain from the unauthorized use of force,275 nor
•

270. See id. at 187 (observing that Presidents interpret or terminate treaties as necessary incident
to executing U.S. foreign policy).
271. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist
School of International Law in the United States, GLOBAL JURIST F'RON11ERS, 2005, at 1, 5, 14.
272. Yoo, supra note 4, at 273·74.
273. See Cole, supra note 9, at 8 (contending that Yoo's argumentation would support legality of
presidential resort to genocide).
274. See Ybo, supra note 4, at 172-73 (treating Kosovo intervention as evidence in support of his
view that Presidents are not bound by international law); id. at 209 (contending that Congress has
power to terminate treaties).
275. See id. at 245 (positing that, except for self-defense or Security Council authorization, selfexecution of treaties makes any executive use of force illegal and unconstitutional); id. ("In using force
against Kosovo, the United States violated the- U.N. Charter and President Ointon, under a self-execution theoryt failed to perfornt his ·constitutional duty to enforce the laws of the land.").
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would he permit the United States to commit its armed forces to an international
engagement because the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force. 276 Y oo
is also apprehensive that the United States might have to abide by adverse
277
and that American citizens might be
decisions of international courts
subjected "to international rules and organizations. "278 When Yoo's arguments
relating to treaties reflect a policy bias, it is a bias not in favor of executive power
but against international law.
V.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION AF'I'ER 9/11

Although both books under review in this Essay suggest that 9/11 and the
war on terror have had an impact on the constitutional allocation of foreign
affairs powers, neither book specifies what that impact ought to be. 279 Yoo
comes the closest, in arguing that the flexibility built into the Constitution
permits unilateral executive acts of war in response to the novel threats of the
post-9/11 world. 280 But Yoo forrnulated many of the arguments in his book in
essays published before 9/11, so it is hard for him to claim that either 9/11 or the
war-on terror justify novel approaches to the constitutional design. The threats to
national security posed by terrorist organizations, while certainly significant, pale
in comparison to the national security threats that the United States faced during
the Cold War, or even to the threats that the young republic faced when it was a
fledgling state confronting e,ighteenth- and nineteenth-century superpowers. The

276., See id. at 246 (noting that "many scholars believe •... that if the Security Council authorizes
war as it did in the 1991 Persian Gulf War th~ United States must use force: to meet the goals set
out by the Council"). This is a strange claim. First, a Security Council Resolution authorizing the use
of force (not "war)') does not obligate any member state to actually use force. Second, since such a
Resolution cannot pass over U.S. opposition, the United States would never be called on to join in
UN-authorized military action against its will; unless one believes, and Yoo does not, that the U.S.
executive lacks the power to embroil the U.S. armed forces in conflict.
277. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 248 (''Presidents are not about to issue unilateral orders to state
prisons halting the executions of foreign nationals duly convicted of capital murder."). It is open to
question whether the foreign nationals at issue here were "duly convicted," since the- United States
does not dispute that they were not accorded their consular rights guaranteed under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S~) 2004 I.C.J. 1, 42·43 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusframe.htm (finding that United States breached its obligatio~s- under Article 36 of Geneva
Convention on Consular Relations to inform detained Mexican nationals of their consular visitation
rights); Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Attorney General
of the United States (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050228-lS.html (stating that United States would comply with Avena decision "by having State
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the_
51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision").
278. Yoo, supra note 4, at 267.
279. See id. at x ("These new threats [the 9/11 attacks] to American national security, driven by
_changes in the international environrne.nt, should change the way we think about the relationship
between the process and substance of the warmaking system."); IRONS, supra note 3, at 3 (suggesting
that issue of constitutional allocation of war powers is especially significant in light of war on terror).
280. Yoo, supra note 4, at x (arguing that after 9/11, ''United States must have the option to use_
force earlier and more quickly than in the past").
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fact that the enemies in the war on terror are often nonstate actors also does not
present novel legal issues, as the United States faced threats from nonstate
actors, in the form of Indian tribes and the Barbary pirates,. at the time of the
founding and in the early republic.
If the post-9/11 world does pose new challenges in the realm of the
constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers, it is not because of 9/11 but
because of the rise of international organizations, including the United Nations
and other collective security organizations. The problem with Irons's approach is
that it would freeze the constitutional allocation of war powers, even if our
current practice ignores that allocation, without providing a normative argument
for why we should today remain bound by an eighteenth-century model. From a
methodological perspective, Y oo's approach is clearly preferable, and this brief
concluding Part suggests how one might follow Yoo's methodology to different
conclusions about the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers.
In Part V.A below, this Essay lays out alternative structural readings of the
Constitution that would produce different results. In Part V.B, this Essay
provides a prudential argument for a new understanding of the constitutional
allocation of war powers that moves beyond both Irons's traditionalism and
Yoo's revisionist nationalism.

A.

An Alternative Structural Approach to the Foreign Affairs Power

A structural approach to the Constitution builds arguments based on
inferences from the fundamental principles underlyin-g the Constitution as well
as from the relationships among those principles.281 Structural arguments are
282
thus at least one and possibly two steps removed from textual arguments.
They require no specific textual hook; rather, they are persuasive to the extent
that the interpreter can convince us both of the importance of the structural
principles at issue and that their interactions within the constitutional edifice
have been properly specified. In short, a structural approach takes a holistic view
of the Constitution, envisioning "the document as a unified whole and its various
provisions and clauses as mutually reinforcing"283 and "attending to the overall
design of the Constitution and the mutually conditioning relationships among its
provisions. "284 Advocates of structural approaches to the Constitution argue that
our textual approach to constitutional adjudication forces courts to bind

281., See BOBBI'IT, supra note 26, at 74 ("Structural arguments are .inferences from the existence
of constitutional structures and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these
structures.").
282. See id. (''[Structural arguments] are to be distinguished from textual and historical
arguments, which construe a particular constitutional passage and the·n use that construction in the
reasoning of an opinion.'').
283. Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutionalism of Mary Ann Glendon, 73 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1333, 1349 (1998}.
284. Mary Ann Glendo:n, Toward a Structural Approach to Constitutional Interpretation, in
BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONS'J'ITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 141, 148 {Terry
Eastland ed., 1995).
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themselves to "the stated intent, however nonsensical, of somebody else. " 285 For
better or worse, structural approaches permit much more creativity in
constitutional interpretation, as one can always stress one structural element
over others in order to reach a desired result. What follows is a small exercise in
the art not science of structural interpretation designed not to displace Yoo's
approach but to suggest how it might be supplemented.
·Y oo's. structural approach emphasizes. separation of powers, at times at the
expense of other structural elements and even at the expense of express
language that undercuts his view of constitutional structure. Preservation of
individual rights figures not at all in his approach to executive power, nor does
his discussion of war powers ever acknowledge the principle of limited
government as a significant element of the Constitution's structure. His approach
is thus inconsistent, as principles of federalism and of limited government figure
prominently (and appropriately) in his discussion of the treaty power. 286 Much of
Yoo's approach to the foreign affairs power hinges on the thesis that Article II's
Vesting Clause functions as a general grant of foreign affairs power to the
President, subject only to the limitations enumerated in the Constitution. Yoo
does not consider how the principles of limited government and federalism
embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments impact on this Vesting Clause
thesis. 287
Irons's approach to the constitutional allocation of war powers assumes
congressional control and judicial oversight. But recent scholarship has
suggested that a large role for the judiciary in ·d eciding vital matters of war and
peace would not have accorded with the Framers' conviction that sovereignty
ultimately resides with the people and their representatives. 288 Although Yoo
does not invoke this scholarship, it is supportive of the part of his attack on the
traditional perspective of war powers that would not bold the executive
accountable through judicial mechanisms. Still, Yoo could not wholeheartedly
embrace the pers_p ective of popular constitutionalism because its main structural
focus is on popular sovereignty as the ultimate. check on the federal government.

285. CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCfURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969).
286. See supra notes 245·51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Missouri v. Holland within
the context of Yoo's federalism.
287. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of Thinking About
Unenumerated Rights Inspired by Philip Bobbitt;s Constitutional Fate, 75 Miss. L.J. 495, 497 (2006)
(noting that traditional view of Ninth Amendment is to establish that federal government is ·one of
limited powers); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendmentt 83 TEX. L. REV.
'331, 336 (2004) (arguing that original purpose of Ninth Amendment was to create "a rule of
construction that limited the interpretation of enJ,lmerated federal power"); Telman, supra note 195, at
184-88 (arguing that notion of inherent executive authority is inconsistent with principle of limited
government embodied in Tenth Amendment).
288. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: PQPULAR CONSTfl"UTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) (noting that people possess "[f]inal interpretive authority" of
Constitution and both courts and political branches were subordinate to this authority); MARK
TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITU'IlON AWAY FROM THE CoURTS, at X (1999) {developing populist
the-ory of constitutional law in which judiciary's constitutional interpretation "has no special normative
weight'').
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The popular constitutionalists thus view the Framers as having embraced a
robust form of participatory democracy that could fetter unilateral executive
action. 289
Finally, neither Yoo nor Irons provides a satisfactory account of the
interaction between international law and domestic law or of the Framers' views
on the extent to which international law, or the law of nations, is incorporated
into U.S. law. The Supreme Court's recourse to international and foreign law in
determining "society's evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth
Amendment in Roper v.; Simmons290 has revived academic interest in this
issue. 291 Recent scholarship suggests that the Framers fully expected
international law to be binding law enforceable through U.S. courts.292
International law could thus be another structural element to consider in
interpreting the Constitution's foreign affairs powers provisions. Alternatively,
from a nonoriginalist perspective, developments in international law and
especially in collective security since World War II provide grounds for
argument that the constitutional allocation of war powers should be set aside in
favor of the modern law of multinational cooperation and collective security.293
•

B.

•

I

•

•

The Foreign Affairs Power in an Age of Multilateralism

Because this Essay has rejected the Vesting Clause thesis, it concludes that
the constitutional text, structure, and pre-1950 history overwhelmingly support
the traditional perspective, favoring congressional involvement in decisionmaking processes relating to war. But the fact that Irons has the stronger

289. According to Kramer, the Federalists envisioned that "formidable popular resistance- via
e1ections, juries, popular outcries, or, in the unlikely event that all these failed, by more violent forms
of opposition" would prevent abuse of power by the federal government. KRAMER, supra note 288, at
83-84.
290. 543 u.s. 551 (2005).
291. See, e.g., Sarah H. Oeveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT;L L. 1, 7 (2006)
(arguing that constitutional design encourages consultation of international law); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109-10
(2005) (hailing Roper as "a return to traditional methods of analysis, dating back to the Court's
earliest discussions of the Eighth Amendment;.' in which the Supreme Court considered foreign law in
determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the
Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REv. 129, 140 (2005) ("[E]ven if the modern death penalty is
quintessentially and peculiarly American, the accumulated legal wisdom of mankind, embodied in ius
gentium, may still have something to offer us."); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator
Problem, 119 HARV. L. REv. 148, 149 (2005) ("The Supreme Court's use of foreign law in
constitutional interpretation is hardly new.").
292. See G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 780
(2006) (''[I]t is clear that the_framers of [the Alien Tort Statute] anticipated that both state and federal
courts would be treating ~the law of nations' as part of the common law they declared and applied in
their decisions.").
293. Both Thomas Franck and David Golove have argued that the constitutional allocation of
war powers have already been changed due to the impact of collective security agreements. See supra
note 195 for a discussion of U.S. execulive power when committing to U.N. actions. They may
overstate the extent to which that change has already occurred, but they also point the w~y for fuller
U.S. commitment to global security through collective security.
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argument on constitutional interpretation does not put him in a celebratory
mood, because there is no question that the constitutional allocation of war
powers has been disregarded in the nuclear age. During the Cold War, Congress
acquiesced in executive unilateralism in response to "three decades of almost
uninterrupted crisis in foreign policy'' 294 and the sense that, given the nuclear
threat, the President needed the capacity for immediate and decisive response to
perceived national security threats. Such congressional acquiescence in executive
unilateralism is no longer appropriate.
Irons's book sets out to demonstrate the dangers of executive unilateralism,
which he links to the United States' imperialist foreign policy. However, his
book actually demonstrates that the political branches have largely worked in
harmony in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Where Congress supports executive
unilateralism295 but the United States' treaty obligations demand cooperation,
national unilateralism poses larger constitutional problems than does executive
unilateralism. The United States committed itself in 1945 to a collective security
system that prohibits unilateral use of force other than in self-defense.296 The
Cold War did not p,e rmit that system to operate as it was designed,2 97 but the end
of the bipolar world offered an opportunity to revive a collective security system
of which the United States was the chief architect. 298 That opportunity is slipping
away but is not yet lost. In order to be true to the design of both the Constitution
and the UN Charter, the President should work with Congress to realize U.S.
treaty obligations relating to peace and security.
Yoo's view that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in
constitutional text or structure. Yoo and the revisionsists would have us favor
domestic policy ends over international law and treaty obligations in every
instance.299 That is contrary both to the understandings of the Framers and to
our constitutional history, which has long recognized that international law is

294. S. REP. No. 93-220, at 8 (1973).
295. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 269 (arguing that Congress has responded to executive
unilateralism in realm of war powers with "blank-check authorizations").
296. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51; see also HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 250 ("The
prohibition on the use of force is the principal norm of modern international law. ").
297. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 253-54.
298. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, Acr OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES AND ENEMIES; AND
THEIR QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD, at xiii (2003) (noting "historic role of the United States in
creating" United Nations).
299. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 171 (contending that "inclusion of customary international
law as federal common law is open to serious doubt"); id. at 172-73 (concluding, upon review of recent
U.S. military conduct, that "international law is not binding within the American legal system") ; see
also John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 221 (2000)
(characterizing "globalist" agenda of international law as reducing constitutional autonomy, impairing
popular sovereignty, reducing U.S. international power, and limiting its domestic and foreign policy
options); John R. Bolton, U.S. Isn't Legally Obligated to Pay the U.N. , WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at
A27 (arguing that United States is not obligated to pay UN dues because treaties are not law but
merely political obligations).
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part of our law. 300 A President acts in bad faith with respect both to the
Constitution and to international law by ratifying a treaty without first making
certain that portions of the treaty requiring domestic implementation can and
will be implemented. Failure to do so implicates the Take Care Clause and the
Supremacy Clause and violates the primary norm of international law: p.acta sunt
servanda.301 The Senate similarly acts in bad faith when it consents to the
ratification of a treaty that requires domestic implementation and then does
nothing to implement the treaty.302
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FuTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Y oo and Irons both assume that the Constitution matters, but they do not
tell us why or to what extent. The Constitution should matter. In areas where the
constitutional text is clear, we should presumptively follow the constitutional
text. The Declare War Clause may not be a model of clarity. It was hastily
composed ''toward the end of the [Constitutional] Convention, in response to
objections raised from the Convention floor;'' 303 John Yoo describes the clause
as the product of an "obscure, garbled, last-minute debate~"304 However, the
enumeration of other war powers in Article I, the Constitution's structural
limitations on executive power, the statements of the Framers as to their
understandings of the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the practice of
the political branches in the early republic all support the traditional view
favoring congressional initiative in matters relating to war and peace.
Increasingly since World War II and certainly since 9/11, Congress has
instead ceded its constitutional war powers to the executive.305 It seems unlikely
300. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
301. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, art. 26 ("Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."}.
302. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") specifies
that the parties to it are obligated
to
implement
it.
See
International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
.
.
Rights art. 2, para. 2, opened for signature Dec~ 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521,999 U.N~T.S. 171 ("Where
not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."). The Senate, in granting its advice
and consent ~o the treaty, spe.cified that it viewed the treaty as non-self-executing. See 138 CONG. REC.
84781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (declaring that United States regardS provisions of Articles 1 through 27
of Covenant non-self-executing). Because Congress has never passed implementing legislation;
plaintiffs have been unable to sustain causes of action claiming violations of the ICCPR in U.S. courts.
See, e.g., White v. Paulson; 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (concluding that ICCPR does
not give rise to private right of action with respect to plaintiffs' claims, as treaty is non-self-executing
and Congress has passed no implementing legislation).
303. Ramsey, Text and History, supra note71, .at 1709.
304. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1656.
305. See IRONS,. supra note 3, at 180-204 (decrying "congressional abdication" of its constitutional
war powers, beginning with Vietnam War); Fisher, supra note 242, at 946·83 (arguing that multilateral
treaties have facilitated postwar expansion of executive war powers).
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that any court will ever decide whether that abdication was lawful or whether
Congress can retrieve the powers that it ceded. The question is thus far more
likely to be decided through politics than law. As John Yoo acknowledges,
through its appropriations power, Congress has the power to rein in the
executive whenever it likes. 306 The real problem is not institutional competence
but institutional self-confidence.
Although the Constitution provides the starting point for any serious
discussion of the allocation of the foreign affairs power, ultimately the issue will
not be decided based on the original intentions of the Framers. As Irons
concludes with resignation, ''only the collective voices and votes of the American
people can provide answers to the questions posed in this book: How and why do
we go to war?" 307 But Breyer's Hamdan concurrence, combined with the new
academic interest in popular constitutionalism, puts a more hopeful spin on
Irons's conclusion. The Framers expected that the country would work out
constitutional conflicts through democratic means. All three branches have
constitutional authority to interpret the constitutional allocation of the foreign
affairs powers, and the citizens of the United States must hold them accountable
when they do so in error.

306. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 9 ("Congress's authority over funding and lawmaking is a
powerful tool that can easily frustrate unilateral executive policies.").
307. IRONS, supra note 3, at 263.
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